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GREENBERG, Circuit Judge. 
 
 This is an appeal from a final judgment of conviction 
and sentence entered by the United States District Court for the 
District of New Jersey on March 30, 1994.  Richard O. Bertoli, 
the appellant, was convicted of obstruction of justice and 
conspiracy to obstruct justice, the third and sixth counts of a 
six-count indictment.  On March 28, 1994, the district court 
sentenced Bertoli to a total term of 100 months imprisonment to 
be followed by two concurrent three-year terms of supervised 
release.  In addition, the court imposed a $7 million fine.  
 Bertoli appeals from both his sentence and his 
conviction.  He contends that he is entitled to a new trial 
because:  (1) the district court failed to inquire properly into 
whether premature jury deliberations prejudiced him; (2) the 
district court's method of conducting ex parte in camera 
interviews with certain jurors violated his constitutional and 
procedural rights; and (3) the district court improperly supplied 
the jury with written transcripts of certain testimony.  Bertoli 
argues in the alternative that his sentence should be vacated 
because:  (1) the district court applied the wrong version of the 
Sentencing Guidelines Manual, thereby violating his right to be 
free from ex post facto punishments; (2) the district court's 
calculation of the loss under the fraud guideline is not 
supported by the record; (3) the district court erred by upwardly 
departing to $7 million from the guidelines range fine of 
  
$125,000.  Finally, Bertoli urges that if the case is remanded, 
it should be reassigned to a different judge.   
 For reasons we explain in detail below, we will affirm 
the judgment of conviction but we will vacate the sentence.  We 
decline to order that the case be reassigned to a different 
judge, and therefore we will remand the matter to the district 
court for resentencing in accordance with this Opinion. 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 On September 29, 1989, a grand jury returned a six-
count superseding indictment, charging Bertoli and two co-
defendants, Richard Cannistraro and Leo Eisenberg, with violating 
RICO, 18 U.S.C. § 1961, et. seq., conspiracy to violate RICO, 
conspiracy to commit securities fraud, and three counts of 
obstruction of justice.  In January 1992, the grand jury returned 
a second superseding indictment, adding obstruction of justice 
counts against Bertoli and Cannistraro, based on their alleged 
continuing efforts to hinder the criminal prosecution.  Eisenberg 
eventually pled guilty to the RICO count of the first superseding 
indictment, and Cannistraro pled guilty to an information 
charging him with conspiracy to obstruct justice.  Bertoli thus 
became the sole remaining defendant. 
 Much of the substantive conduct described at the trial 
is not generally relevant to this appeal.  However, certain 
evidence is -- evidence of conduct underlying Counts One and Two, 
which the district court termed the "stock manipulations 
schemes," and of conduct underlying Counts Three and Six, the 
  
counts of conviction.1  Essentially, Bertoli and his co-
conspirators were charged with unlawfully manipulating the prices 
of certain stocks.  The scheme worked by creating artificial 
demand, which in turn artificially raised the price of the 
stocks.  For example, Bertoli allocated units of certain initial 
public offerings of stock ("IPOs") to individuals and entities he 
controlled.  Those players restricted the purchase and sale of 
the stocks in keeping with Bertoli's and Eisenberg's 
instructions, thus, essentially setting the price, creating a 
demand, and ensuring that the price rose.  After the prices rose, 
Bertoli and the others sold their shares at a profit.  
Additionally, to raise the prices still further, Cannistraro, who 
was an analyst at the firm of Wood Gundy, Inc., attracted buyers 
by writing favorable reports about the IPOs.2 
 The third count charged Bertoli with conspiracy to 
obstruct several criminal and civil investigations into his 
unlawful securities fraud.  The count alleged that he conspired 
to obstruct:  (1) an investigation conducted by the Securities 
and Exchange Commission ("SEC"), beginning in 1983, of fraudulent 
and manipulative trading of two stocks; (2) a civil action 
                     
1
.  Most of the issues in this appeal involve incidents occurring 
at trial, and the trial court's responses.  We set forth those 
facts as they become pertinent in the analysis. 
2
.  Count One specifically charged that the defendants violated 
the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act ("RICO"), 
18 U.S.C. §§ 1961, et seq., by conducting the affairs of Monarch 
Funding Corp., a securities brokerage firm in New York City, 
through a pattern of racketeering activity.  Count Two charged 
the defendants with conspiracy to violate RICO. 
  
brought in 1985 by the SEC against Bertoli and others; (3) a 
1985-86 grand jury investigation; (4) a 1987 prosecution against 
Cannistraro; and (5) the current action.  The conspirators 
allegedly achieved their object by causing brokers and others to 
conceal evidence from the investigators and the grand jury.  The 
count alleged 33 overt acts, consisting of telephone calls 
between the defendants and others, and false statements by the 
defendants.  The count alleged that in furtherance of the 
conspiracy, the defendants destroyed documents relating to 
certain accounts, filed a false financial disclosure form with 
the United States Probation Office, transferred funds in the 
Cayman Islands, and knowingly submitted false affidavits during 
this prosecution.  Count Six charged that Bertoli and others 
obstructed justice by transferring certain proceeds of 
racketeering activity from the Cayman Islands to the Principality 
of Andorra in Europe, with the deliberate intent to hide their 
criminal activity and unlawful gains from the United States 
government. 
 The case against Bertoli was tried between June 1, 
1993, and August 24, 1993.  For the first seven weeks of trial, 
Bertoli was pro se; thereafter, an attorney entered the case on 
his behalf.  On August 24, 1993, the jury returned a verdict 
finding Bertoli guilty of one count of obstruction of justice 
(Count Six) and one count of conspiracy to commit obstruction of 
justice (Count Three).  But the jury acquitted Bertoli on all 
other counts.  Bertoli made a timely motion for a new trial, 
which the district court denied.  On March 28, 1994, after the 
  
district court imposed the sentence, Bertoli timely filed his 
notice of appeal.  We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 
1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742.  The district court had jurisdiction 
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  We will address the trial issues 
and the sentencing issues in turn. 
 
 II.  DISCUSSION 
A.  Trial Issues 
1.  Adequacy of court's inquiry into jury misconduct 
 Bertoli first contends that the trial court failed  
adequately to investigate whether premature jury deliberations 
prejudiced him.  Bertoli moved for a mistrial on the issue; he 
also made a post-trial motion for a new trial.  Both motions were 
denied. 
   a.  Factual background 
 On August 11, 1993, the court began reading the charge 
to the jury.  During a recess, Juror Six informed the court that 
an alternate juror had engaged her in a premature, improper 
discussion about the merits of the case.  With counsel present, 
the juror was brought before the court, and the following 
colloquy ensued: 
 THE COURT:  You mentioned to me as I was walking out 
that somebody mentioned to you an opinion about the 
case? 
 
 THE JUROR:  Correct. 
 
 THE COURT:  I don't want to know what it is.  Has that 
affected your ability to be fair and impartial? 
 




App. at 675-76.  The trial court procured from Juror Six the 
identity of the jurors who engaged her in the premature 
conversations.  All three of them -- Jurors Thirteen, Fourteen 
and Fifteen -- were alternates.  One at a time, the court 
summoned these alternate jurors to the courtroom for questioning 
by the court in the presence of counsel for both Bertoli and the 
government.  The record reflects the following conversation 
between the court and Juror Thirteen: 
 THE COURT:  The juror who was just out here indicated 
to me that you mentioned to her something about the 
case.  I stress I did not ask her what it is, I do not 
know what it is, I don't want to know what it is. 
 
  I have instructed all the jury not to express or 
deliberate in any way in the case. 
 
  Have you mentioned anything to anybody else about 
the case? 
 
 THE JUROR:  No, I haven't your Honor. 
 
 THE COURT:  Again, you can't go into any detail. 
   
 I'm going to excuse you from deliberation.  . . .  
App. at 677-78.  The court had nearly identical conversations 
with Jurors Fourteen and Fifteen.  Both of the jurors denied 
discussing the case with any juror other than Juror Six and the 
court excused both from their responsibilities as well. 
 When the court concluded its voir dire, Bertoli moved 
for a mistrial or, alternatively, either that the court similarly 
question the other jurors or that Juror Six be excused.  Stating 
that "[s]he has expressed to me her ability to be fair and 
impartial and I'm satisfied she can be on that", the court denied 
  
the motions.   App. at 680.  Bertoli's counsel then requested the 
court to probe further into the intra-jury communications.  The 
court reiterated its belief that the jury remained untainted, but 
agreed to "in camera ask each of them what they said and seal it, 
so the Circuit has it."  App. at 687.  During the next recess, 
the alternate jurors and Juror Six were called into the judge's 
chambers for further interviews.  Neither Bertoli nor his 
attorney was present for this second round of questioning. 
 The court first interviewed Juror Thirteen.  Because 
Bertoli relies heavily on this conversation, we quote the 
transcript extensively: 
 THE COURT:  Juror number six, Sheila, Miss Wheil, says 
that you mentioned something to her and that's what she 
mentioned to me and that's what I asked you about in 
court. 
 
  You're not a deliberating juror.  From what I 
know, it's no big deal, but just to satisfy the 
attorneys out there, I'm putting it on the record.  
Don't be concerned. 
 
 A: Okay. 
 
 Q: Did you express an opinion as to guilt or 
innocence? 
 
 A: No. 
 
 Q: You didn't? 
 
 A: No.  That's why I was wondering why I was excused 
because -- 
 
 Q: Everybody would have been excused anyway.  We had 
all 12 jurors.   
 
  Please, don't be upset with me or the process. 
 
  
 A: I'm not.   
  
 
  First of all, let me say something.  It's been an 
honor and privilege to be here.  I realize this is the 
process.  I have learned a lot, I really have.  I 
learned a lot.  It's been a privilege and I kind of 
feel violated about what happened today because -- 
 
 Q: You know, don't, because from -- you were number 
13.  From number 13 to 20, you all knew that. 
 
 A: I understand that. 
 
 Q: You guys did yeomen work. . . .   
 
 *  *  * 
 
  Look, Miss Wheil just mentioned to me that you 
mentioned something to her about the case and I said, 
fine, I'll find out about it. 
 
  That's why I asked if you mentioned anything to 
anybody else.  You said you didn't.   
 
  I just want to put it on the record so these 
attorneys have their record.  It will be sealed.   
 
  If they want to use it, the Court of Appeals will 
look at it.  It's no big deal as far as you're 
concerned.  I'm just trying to maintain the integrity 
of the process. 
 
 A: I understand. 
 
 Q: Please don't be upset with me. 
 
 A: No, but I would like to tell you what happened. 
 
 Q: Sure. 
 
 A: I pulled in the parking lot this morning, so I 
waited for her, to walk in the building together. 
 
  She says to me, she says, 'How in the hell does he 
think he's going to get away with this?' 
 
  I say to her, I says, 'What are you talking about?  
Get away with what?' 
 
  She says, 'Bertoli.' 
 
  
  I says, 'Bertoli's innocent until he's proven 
guilty.' 
 
 Q: That's all you said. 
 
 A: That's what I said. 
 
 Q: It's not a problem. 
 
 A:   I'm not going to go through the process of 
deliberating.  But you have to look at all of the 
evidence before you can say the man is guilty. 
 
 Q: As you heard my instruction out in court, that's 
exactly what I told the jury. 
 
 A: This is what I told her this morning.  I walked in 
the building and that's [sic] was it. 
 
  Your Honor, we don't even communicate.  The only 
reason why I waited for her this morning was because I 
thought, well, I don't run into her very often, I'll 
wait for her just to be polite. 
 
 Q: Mr. Bowen, it's no big deal. 
 
 A: But, your Honor, I got a lot of questions I want 
to ask you. 
 
 Q: I told -- as a matter of fact, once the jurors 
begin deliberating, I'll bring all the alternates in 
and we can talk about the case.  That's not a problem.  
I told you folks we would do that. 
 
  When the jury returns its verdicts, I'll sit down 
and chew the fat with them, too. 
 
  That's all I want to do right now is just clear 
this up.  It's no big deal.  There is no problem.  I 
see absolutely no consideration. 
 
 A.   But there is a problem.  There is a problem.  
 
 Q:   Well -- 
 
 A: The problem is with her because she's been 
expressing opinions all along in the trial.  No one has 
communicated with her. 
 
 Q:  Great.  That's terrific.  That's terrific. 
  
 
 A: She's the only one that has expressed an opinion 
and for the three of us to take the weight, this looks 
very bad. 
 
 Q: No, no, please.   
 
  You have to understand, I'm not assessing blame on 
anyone and the only reason I'm talking to you right now 
is just to have a record for the lawyers.  
 
 A: Your Honor, there's a problem. 
 
 Q: Please, there is no problem with you and we can -- 
 
 A: Just forget it? 
 
 Q: You have no problem.  I really feel bad that 
you're upset -- because you have been such -- it's been 
fun just having you. 
 
 A: It has been fun. 
 
  I'm not upset.  Don't get me wrong if I'm 
expressing myself that way. 
 
 Q: Let it drop.  It's no big deal and I want to tell 
the other two jurors that I feel bad for them, too. 
 
 A: It's one of those things. 
 
 Q: It's just one of those things. 
 
App. at 689-93. 
 
 The in camera examinations of the other two alternate 
jurors took much less time.  The jurors each denied expressing or 
being told a view as to Bertoli's guilt or innocence.  The court 
then proceeded to question Juror Six: 
 Q: Have deliberations begun yet? 
 
 A: Absolutely not.  
 
 Q: . . . Have you prejudged the case? 
 
 A: No I have not. 
  
 
 Q: Are you fair and impartial? 
 
 A: I believe I am. 
 
 Q: And are you ready to begin your deliberations with 
the jury? 
 
 A: Yes. 
 
 Q: From scratch? 
 
 A: Yes. 
 
 Q: Okay.  There is nothing that would prevent you 
from being fair and impartial in the case? 
 
 A: No. 
 
 Q: That's it.  Don't worry about it. 
 
App. at 694-95. 
 Following these conversations, the court made factual 
findings, outside the presence of the attorneys "for whatever 
purpose it may be appropriate, for the circuit, if necessary."  
App. at 696-97.  The court concluded that Juror Six did not 
prejudge the case, that there had been no outside influence of 
the jury, and that Juror Thirteen's accusations about Juror Six 
arose "more out of pique than out of accuracy."  App. at 696.  
The court found that no one in the jury room had made any 
determination as to guilt or innocence.  Rather, "if there's been 
any comment, it may have been sporadic comments on individual 
witnesses or individual presentation of evidence or the amount of 
evidence or the manner of the presentation of the evidence."  Id.  
He concluded that "I am satisfied upon further reflection that 
  
this jury did exactly what it was supposed to do up to the time 
it began deliberations this afternoon."  App. at 697. 
 According to its March 28, 1994 Letter Opinion3 
(hereinafter "Opinion") and findings, the court based its 
determinations on its evaluation of "the demeanor and credibility 
of all four jurors upon questioning and from general observation 
of the jury throughout the ten-week trial."  App. at 279.  It 
found Juror Thirteen's accusations against Juror Six incredible, 
because "the statement Alternate Juror Thirteen sought to 
attribute to Juror Six was wholly out of character for her."  
App. at 281.  Moreover, it contrasted Juror Six's "cool, calm and 
deliberate" responses with Alternate Juror Thirteen's visible 
consternation.  App. at 281. 
 While the interviews and fact-findings were 
transcribed, the court initially sealed the transcripts.  It 
released them to the attorneys when the verdicts were returned. 
Upon receipt of the transcripts, Bertoli made a renewed motion 
for a new trial based on what he characterized as new evidence, 
meaning the content of the transcribed conversations. 
 
   b.  Analysis 
 Bertoli contends that his Sixth Amendment right to a 
fair trial before an impartial jury has been violated because the 
district court failed adequately to investigate and assess 
                     
3
.  The district court issued a 629-page letter-opinion after the 
sentencing, setting forth the reasons for a variety of its pre-
trial, trial and post-trial decisions. 
  
whether premature communications among the jurors about the 
merits of the case prejudiced him.  The government argues in 
response that the district court thoroughly and adequately 
questioned the affected jurors and that the court's findings are 
in accord with the evidence in the record. 
 We review a district court's denial of motions for a 
mistrial and a new trial, as well as its investigation of jury 
misconduct, for abuse of discretion.  United States v. Resko, 3 
F.3d 684, 688 (3d Cir. 1993); Rotondo v. Keene Corp., 956 F.2d 
436, 438 (3d Cir. 1992); Government of Virgin Islands v. Lima, 
774 F.2d 1245, 1250 (3d Cir. 1985).  That discretion extends to 
the court's findings on whether the jury misconduct prejudiced 
the defendant.  Resko, 3 F.3d at 688. 
 "It is fundamental that every litigant who is entitled 
to trial by jury is entitled to an impartial jury, free to the 
furthest extent practicable from extraneous influences that may 
subvert the fact-finding process."  Waldorf v. Shuta, 3 F.3d 705, 
709 (3d Cir. 1993).  Partly to ensure that this right is upheld, 
"[i]t [has been] a generally accepted principle of trial 
administration that jurors must not engage in discussions of a 
case before they have heard both the evidence and the court's 
legal instructions and have begun formally deliberating as a 
collective body."  Resko, 3 F.3d at 688; see also United States 
v. DiSalvo, No. 93-1442, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 23727 at *62 (3d 
Cir. August 31, 1994).  Premature deliberations present a number 
of dangers, all in some manner affecting or touching upon the 
  
criminal defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a fair and 
impartial jury trial.  In Resko, we identified a number of these: 
 (1) Since premature deliberations are more likely to 
occur before the defendant has had an opportunity to 
present his or her case, the prosecution has an unfair 
influence on the juror's initial impressions; 
 
 (2)  Once a juror has expressed views on a particular 
issue, that juror has a "stake" in the expressed view 
and may give undue weight to additional evidence that 
supports, rather than undercuts, his or her view; 
 
 (3)  Individual conversations between selected jurors 
thwart the goal of a collective, deliberative process 
between the jurors as a group; 
 
 (4)  Often, the premature deliberations occur before 
the jurors are instructed on the reasonable doubt 
standard, and hence the jurors may reach a result using 
an incorrect, and unconstitutional, standard of proof. 
 
Resko, 3 F.3d at 689-70.  Thus, premature deliberations must be 
guarded against and responded to appropriately.  Id. at 689.4 
 In this regard, "'[w]e have recognized that 'voir dire' 
is the appropriate method for inquiry into possible prejudice or 
                     
4
.  In Resko, we noted that "the practice has developed that 
trial judges admonish juries at the outset of trial not to 
discuss the case with anyone before the conclusion of the trial."  
Resko, 3 F.3d at 689 (citing cases and commentary). 
 
 In this case, the trial court admonished the jurors on 
a number of occasions.  For example, after the parties' 
respective summations, the court instructed the jury: 
 
 As I cautioned you yesterday, I indicated you should 
not discuss or deliberate [on] this matter.  Although 
you heard the summations of the attorneys, you've not 
had the benefit of my charge and I direct that you 
should not begin deliberations in any way until you've 
had the benefit of my charge and you're all together in 
the juryroom. 
 
App. at 274. 
  
bias on the part of jurors, and that the procedure used must 
provide a reasonable assurance for the discovery of prejudice.'"  
Waldorf, 3 F.3d at 709 (quoting Government of Virgin Islands v. 
Dowling, 814 F.2d 134, 139 (3d Cir. 1987)) (also citing United 
States v. Pantone, 609 F.2d 675 (3d Cir. 1979); United States v. 
Clapps, 732 F.2d 1148 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1085, 105 
S.Ct. 589 (1984); United States v. Jackson, 649 F.2d 967 (3d 
Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1034, 102 S.Ct. 574 (1981)).   
 Nonetheless, "[t]he particular method of conducting 
voir dire is left to the sound discretion of the district court."  
United States v. DiSalvo, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 23727 at *57 n.18.  
Thus, in United States v. Console, 13 F.3d 641 (3d Cir. 1993), 
cert. denied, ____ U.S. ____, 114 S.Ct. 1660 (1994), we noted 
that where the trial court has conducted an individualized voir 
dire, we generally should defer to its handling of the situation.  
In that case, "the [district] court conducted a corrective voir 
dire and was 'convinced that there was no prejudicial juror 
misconduct and . . . that defendants received a fair trial'".  
Id. at 667 (quoting Clapps, 732 F.2d at 1152) (alteration in 
original).  Hence, we held that the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion.  Id. at 667-68. 
 There are compelling reasons why the trial court must 
be given wide latitude to assess and respond to allegations of 
juror misconduct.  "The trial court is obviously in a far better 
position to observe the impact of premature jury discussions of 
guilt, and to make a considered judgment as to the effectiveness 
of a cautionary instruction."  Pantone, 609 F.2d at 679; see also 
  
Clapps, 732 F.2d at 1152 (same).  After all, "the trial judge 
develops a relationship with the jury during the course of a 
trial that places him or her in a far better position than an 
appellate court to measure what a given situation requires."  
Government of Virgin Islands v. Dowling, 814 F.2d at 137; see 
also Resko, 3 F.3d at 690 ("the trial judge has discretion . . . 
to decide how to deal with a situation in which there is an 
allegation of . . . premature jury deliberations"); United States 
v. Thornton, 1 F.3d 149, 155 (3d Cir.) (same), cert. denied, ____ 
U.S. ____, 114 S.Ct. 483 (1993); United States v. Aiello, 771 
F.2d 621, 629 (2d Cir. 1985) (same); United States v. Phillips, 
664 F.2d 971, 998 (5th Cir. 1981) (same), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 
1136, 102 S.Ct. 2965 (1982). 
 Of course, even though the trial court is entitled to 
deference, the reviewing court must satisfy itself that "the 
district court meaningfully . . . assess[ed] the nature and 
extent of the jurors' premature discussions in order to ascertain 
whether there has been any prejudice to the defendants."  Resko, 
3 F.3d at 690.  Consequently, when the district court has failed 
adequately to ensure that the defendant has not been prejudiced 
by the improper conduct, we have remanded the case for a new 
trial.  See, e.g., Government of Virgin Islands v. Weatherwax, 20 
F.3d 572, 578-79 (3d Cir. 1994) (attorney's failure to request 
court to investigate the prejudicial effect of jury exposure to 
extra-record newspaper accounts of trial could constitute 
ineffective assistance of counsel for habeas corpus purposes); 
Waldorf, 3 F.3d at 713 (remanding case for new trial on damages 
  
where district court failed to conduct a "searching inquiry into 
the extent and nature of the prejudicial extrajudicial 
information that reached the jurors so as to ascertain for itself 
whether there was a substantial likelihood of prejudice such that 
a new trial was warranted"); Resko, 3 F.3d at 695 (remanding case 
for new trial where district court failed to conduct meaningful 
inquiry into allegations of prejudicial intra-jury 
communications).   
 This case is not like those, however, and we do not 
find that the district court abused its discretion in its 
response to the allegations of improper intra-jury 
communications.  We further conclude that the district court's 
finding that the intra-jury communications did not prejudice 
Bertoli is supported adequately by the record. 
 In the first place, intra-jury communications pose a 
less serious threat to a defendant's right to an impartial trial 
than do extra-jury influences, and therefore district courts are 
entitled to even greater deference in their responses to them 
than in responses to outside influences.  See, e.g., Resko, 3 
F.3d at 690 (citing cases).  As we said in Resko: 
 It has long been recognized that when jurors are 
influenced by the media and other publicity, or when 
they engage in communications with third parties, these 
[outside] influences pose a substantial threat to the 
fairness of the criminal proceeding because the 
extraneous information completely evades the safeguards 
of the judicial process.  In contrast, when there are 
premature deliberations among jurors with no 
allegations of external influence on the jury, the 
proper process for jury decisionmaking has been 
violated, but there is no reason to doubt that the jury 
based its ultimate decision only on evidence formally 
presented at trial. 
  
 
Resko, 3 F.3d at 690 (emphasis in original);  DiSalvo, 1994 U.S. 
LEXIS 23727 at *62 (intra-jury influences less serious than 
extra-jury influences).  Because extra-jury influences are far 
more serious than intra-jury influences, certain extra-jury 
influences create a presumption of prejudice that must be 
rebutted by the government for the court to uphold the 
conviction.  See United States v. Console, 13 F.3d at 666.  But 
cases involving impermissible intra-jury contacts do not create 
such a presumption.  See id. at 666 n.29 (presumption of 
prejudice not created in Resko because the case "did not involve 
third-party contact with a juror").  
 The distinction between extra-jury influences and 
intra-jury communications is significant, and becomes apparent by 
comparing the facts of this case with those in Waldorf.  In that 
personal injury case, the plaintiff was rendered a quadriplegic 
as a result of a motor vehicle accident.  During the trial, media 
reports of a verdict in a similar case, to which the jury was 
exposed and which they discussed among themselves, "placed before 
the jury the very same type of information the district court had 
excluded as inadmissible."  Waldorf, 3 F.3d at 707.  Thus, the 
circumstances posed a serious risk that an extraneous and 
inadmissible newspaper article may have vitiated procedural 
rulings based on fairness to both sides.  In this case, by 
contrast, and similarly to most cases involving premature 
deliberations, there is no contention that the jury was exposed 
to extraneous influences; instead, the concern is that the trial 
  
was tainted because jurors prematurely spoke their views about 
the evidence they properly were considering.  Thus, we should be 
especially wary about second-guessing the district court in this 
case. 
 At any rate, the court did conduct a voir dire of 
particular members of the jury, and did make findings that the 
premature deliberations did not prejudice Bertoli.  As detailed 
above, after Juror Six approached the court with her accusations, 
the court immediately ascertained the identities of the jurors 
who had engaged her in premature conversations.  The court then 
questioned the four jurors with counsel present, determined that 
Juror Six was the only juror with whom they conversed about the 
case, and then disqualified the three alternate jurors.  The 
court also satisfied itself that Juror Six had not prejudged the 
case.   
 While Bertoli argues that Juror Six should have been 
disqualified, we cannot say that the court's finding that she was 
not tainted by the premature deliberations was clearly erroneous.  
Indeed, quite the opposite is true.  The court examined her 
twice, and relied on her answers to its questions, her demeanor, 
her behavior during the trial and the fact that she was the juror 
who brought the premature deliberations to the court's attention.  
See, e.g., Clapps, 732 F.2d at 1152 (trial court's decision to 
remove jurors who spoke to a third juror, but not to remove the 
third juror, when that juror informed the court about the 
conversations, was not clearly erroneous). 
  
 Similarly, we cannot say that the court's decision to 
believe Juror Six over Juror Thirteen was clearly erroneous.  The 
trial court had to believe one of the two jurors.  And as the 
court said in its opinion, despite interviews with three 
alternate jurors, only Juror Thirteen identified Juror Six as the 
culprit.  Moreover, the trial court was entitled to consider the 
fact that Juror Six volunteered information to the court, while 
Juror Thirteen did not.   
 Further, we do not find error in the trial court's 
denial of counsel's request that it question the other jurors.  
Because the court believed Juror Six and disbelieved Juror 
Thirteen, there was no need to investigate further, as the court 
interviewed all the jurors involved in the misconduct.  Of 
course, Bertoli could -- and does -- argue that the court at any 
rate should have corroborated its impressions by interviewing the 
other jurors.  But in the first place, "[t]he more speculative or 
unsubstantiated the allegation of misconduct, the less the burden 
to investigate."  United States v. Caldwell, 776 F.2d 989, 998 
(11th Cir. 1985).  Second, in these type of situations, the trial 
court must balance the potential benefits of further 
investigation against the possible harm of calling attention to a 
relatively minor situation about which the other jurors may have 
been unaware: 
 '[i]n determining whether to [question jurors] . . ., 
the court must balance the probable harm resulting from 
the emphasis such action would place upon the 
misconduct and the disruption involved in conducting a 
hearing against the likely extent and gravity of the 
prejudice generated by that misconduct.  We, as an 
appellate tribunal, are in a poor position to evaluate 
  
these competing considerations; we have only an 
insentient record before us.' 
 
Thornton, 1 F.3d at 156 (quoting United States v. Chiantese, 582 
F.2d 974, 980 (5th Cir. 1978) (alterations in original), cert. 
denied, 441 U.S. 922, 99 S.Ct. 2030 (1979)).5 
 It is true that in Resko, we remanded the case for a 
new trial because the inquiry into the content and effect of 
premature jury deliberations had been inadequate.  But that case 
readily is distinguished.  In Resko, the trial court received 
information that members of the jury were discussing the case 
during recesses and while waiting in the jury room.  The court 
denied defense counsel's request that the court conduct an 
individualized voir dire of the jurors, instead asking each to 
fill out a written questionnaire.  3 F.3d at 687-88.  The 
questionnaire asked the jurors simply: (1) whether he or she had 
                     
5
.  The trial court refused to ask the four jurors about the 
substance of their conversations.  Apparently, the trial court 
was concerned about violating Fed. R. Evid. 606(b), which 
provides that "[u]pon an inquiry into the validity of a verdict 
or indictment, a juror may not testify as to any matter or 
statement occurring during the course of the jury's deliberations 
. . . ."  See app. at 275.  Of course, because the conversations 
occurred prior to official deliberations, and because the court 
was not inquiring into the validity of a verdict or indictment, 
the rule did not apply to the situation in this case.  Cf. 
DiSalvo, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS at **65-66 (rule applies to prevent 
judge from inquiring into alleged statements made during 
deliberations).  To the contrary, when premature deliberations 
have taken place, we have held that it is generally incumbent 
upon the district court to inquire into "the nature of the 
jurors' discussions."  Resko, 3 F.3d at 691 (emphasis added).  
Nonetheless, under the facts of this case, we find no abuse of 
discretion.  The court assured itself that the jurors did not 
discuss guilt or innocence and had not prejudged the case.  
Moreover, the court disqualified the alternate jurors. 
  
discussed the facts of the case with one or more of the other 
jurors; and (2) if yes, whether, because of those discussions, he 
or she had formed an opinion about the guilt or non-guilt of the 
defendants.  All the jurors answered "yes" to question 1 and "no" 
to question 2.     
 By using a two-question form, the district court was 
unable "to know the nature of the jurors' discussions and whether 
these discussions in fact resulted in prejudice to the 
defendants."  Id. at 690.  While the questionnaire told the court 
that each of the jurors engaged in premature discussions, "there 
[was] no way to know . . . whether they involved merely brief and 
inconsequential conversations about minor matters or whether they 
involved full-blown discussions of the defendants' guilt or 
innocence."  Id. at 690-91.  In short, the district court -- as 
well as the reviewing court -- simply had insufficient 
information upon which to evaluate the allegations.  There was no 
voir dire to review, and there were no reliable findings upon 
which we could apply a deferential standard.  Accordingly we were 
unable to review the district court's findings at all.  As we 
explained, the need for a remand was "unfortunate" and we limited 
our holding to the facts of that case, facts which we thought -- 
and still think -- unlikely to recur.  Id. at 695. 
   Unlike the arguments in Resko, Bertoli's arguments 
are directed to the method and scope of the trial court's 
response, rather than to whether a response existed at all.  It 
is also significant that the trial court's findings are 
corroborated by the nature of the verdict itself.  It is 
  
difficult to credit Bertoli's accusations, when the allegedly 
prejudiced jury acquitted him on most counts of the indictment 
including the most serious charges.  As we said in an analogous 
context, "[w]hen the jury is instructed to base its verdict 
solely on the evidence and it acquits the defendant of certain 
counts, such factors indicate that the jury was not biased."  
DiSalvo, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 23727 at *69 (citing United States 
v. Thornton, 1 F.3d at 156).  See also United States v. Gilsenan, 
949 F.2d 90, 96 (3d Cir. 1991) (where jury "delivered a fractured 
verdict . . . among the offenses . . . [w]e cannot conceive in 
these circumstances tht the allegedly prejudiced information 
could have had an impact on the verdict"), cert. denied,      
U.S.     , 112 S.Ct. 2971 (1992). 
 In sum, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial 
court's handling of the allegations of jury misconduct and its 
finding that the defendant was not prejudiced by the premature 
jury deliberations. 
 
2.  Propriety of the Ex Parte interviews 
 Bertoli next contends that the trial court erred in 
conducting ex parte interviews with members of the jury without 
his presence or the presence of his counsel.  He argues that the 
error was exacerbated by the fact that the court did not unseal 
the transcript of the ex parte discussions until after the jury 
returned its verdict.  Bertoli claims that the trial court's 
actions violated his rights under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments 
and his right to be present during all stages of a trial pursuant 
  
to Fed. R. Crim. P. 43.  The government responds that Bertoli 
waived his rights under all of these provisions by failing to 
object to the in camera interviews when the district court 
informed the attorneys of its intention to proceed in that 
manner.  Alternatively, the government incorporates the arguments 
made in the trial court's opinion explaining its decision.  As 
this issue involves solely questions concerning the 
interpretation of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and the 
Constitution, our review is plenary.  Government of Virgin 
Islands v. Knight, 989 F.2d 619, 626 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 
____ U.S. ____, 114 S.Ct. 556 (1993). 
 
a.  Fifth Amendment 
 The due process clause of the Fifth Amendment grants 
criminal defendants the "right to be present at all stages of the 
trial where his absence might frustrate the fairness of the 
proceedings. . . . "  Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819 n. 
15, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 2533 n.15 (1975); United States v. Gagnon, 470 
U.S. 522, 526, 105 S.Ct. 1482, 1484 (1985); Snyder v. 
Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105-06, 54 S.Ct. 330, 332 (1934).  
This does not mean, however, that the defendant has a 
"constitutional right to be present at every interaction between 
a judge and a juror."  Gagnon, 470 U.S. at 526, 105 S.Ct. at 
1484.  Rather, "'[t]he mere occurrence of an ex parte 
conversation between a trial judge and a juror does not 
constitute a deprivation of any constitutional right.'"  Id. 
(quoting Rushen v. Spain, 464 U.S. 114, 125-26, 104 S.Ct. 453, 
  
459 (1983) (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment) (alteration 
added)).  In particular, and in the absence of some special 
circumstance, "[i]t is clear that there is no constitutional 
right for a defendant to be present at a conference in chambers 
concerning dismissal of a juror."  United States v. Provenzano, 
620 F.2d 985, 997-98 (3d Cir.) (emphasis in original) (citing 
cases), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 899, 101 S.Ct. 267 (1980); see 
also United States v. Brown, 571 F.2d 980, 986-87 (6th Cir. 1978) 
(appellants' asserted right to be present at in-chambers 
conference concerning disqualification of juror "was not 
constitutionally required").  In fact, as the Supreme Court has 
intimated, the presence of a defendant with counsel during such a 
conference well may have a counterproductive effect on the 
discussion, by impacting on the jurors' willingness to freely 
discuss the issues.  Gagnon, 470 U.S. at 527, 105 S.Ct. at 1485; 
United States v. Aiello, 771 F.2d at 629 (in certain 
circumstances, "the trial judge, aided by his personal 
observation and appraisal of all persons concerned, may choose a 
private inquiry in the more relaxed atmosphere of the robing 
room"). 
 In this case, the trial court's interview with the 
jurors did not implicate Bertoli's Fifth Amendment rights.  
First, the in camera conversations constituted the second round 
of jury interviews, and essentially went over the same ground as 
the prior voir dire conducted in open court with counsel present.  
Second, as detailed above, the allegations involved solely intra-
jury communications, as opposed to extraneous influences, so the 
  
inquiry was not so significant a part of the trial.  Rather, the 
interviews constituted "a short interlude in a complex trial."  
Gagnon, 470 U.S. at 527, 105 S.Ct. at 1484; see also Verdin v. 
O'Leary, 972 F.2d 1467, 1482 (7th Cir. 1992) ("'Only a trial 
fundamentally unfair in light of the entire proceedings violates 
the open-ended aspect of [this] constitutional protection.'") 
(quotation omitted) (alteration in original); United States v. 
Brown, 923 F.2d 109, 112 (8th Cir.) (no constitutional right to 
be present at in camera conference between court and jurors), 
cert. denied, ____ U.S. ____, 112 S.Ct. 110 (1991).  Finally, we 
doubt whether the jurors would have been as comfortable 
discussing their conduct had Bertoli been present.6  Thus, we 
hold that Bertoli had no Fifth Amendment right to be present 
during the in camera interviews. 
 
b.  Rule 43 
 Fed. R. Crim. P. 43 provides in pertinent part: 
 (a)  Presence Required.  The defendant shall be present 
at the arraignment, at the time of the plea, at every 
stage of the trial including the impaneling of the jury 
and the return of the verdict, and at the imposition of 
sentence, except as otherwise provided by this rule. 
 
 (b)  Continued Presence Not Required.  The further 
progress of the trial to and including the return of 
the verdict shall not be prevented and the defendant 
shall be considered to have waived the right to be 
present whenever a defendant, initially present, 
 
                     
6
.  The government argues that Bertoli waived any Fifth Amendment 
right he may have had.  Because we find that he had no such right 
in this case, there was nothing to waive. 
  
  (1) is voluntarily absent after the trial is 
commenced . . . . 
 
See also Crosby v. United States, ____ U.S. ____, ____, 113 S.Ct. 
748, 751 (1993). 
 In Gagnon, the Supreme Court expressly declined to 
address whether Rule 43 guarantees defendants a right to be 
present during an in camera conference between the trial court 
and a juror.  Other courts, however, generally have held that a 
conference between the court and a juror concerning the possible 
dismissal of a juror does fall within the purview of Rule 43. 
See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 571 F.2d at 985-87; United 
States v. Baca, 494 F.2d 424, 428-29 (10th Cir. 1974).  In United 
States v. Provenzano, we held that when the relevant facts were 
undisputed and therefore the conference between the court and the 
juror involved solely a question of law, Rule 43 did not apply.  
620 F.2d at 998 (citing Fed. R. Crim. P. 43(c)(3), which provides 
that "[a] defendant need not be present . . . [a]t a conference 
or argument upon a question of law"). 
 Nonetheless, regardless of whether the defendant does 
have such a right, a question we need not decide, it is well 
settled that the right is subject to both the doctrines of waiver 
and harmless error.  See, e.g., Gagnon, 470 U.S. at 529, 105 
S.Ct. at 1486 (right subject to waiver); Provenzano, 620 F.2d at 
998 (right subject to harmless error doctrine).  Here we find 
that Bertoli waived any right he may have had pursuant to Fed. R. 
Cr. P. 43. 
  
 The trial court's decision to conduct in-camera 
interviews of the jurors arose in the following context: 
 MR. LEVITT [defense counsel]:  I'm still a little 
concerned about the incident with juror number six and 
numbers 13, 14 and 15 . . . . 
 
 THE COURT:  I understand what you're saying there, but 
I'm not inclined, and I'll think about as I go into 
chambers, to require them to discuss it and I'm not 
giving you or the Government leave to approach the 
jurors.  I'm specifically telling you you do not.  When 
I say 'you', I can't look at you both.  The collective 
you and your agents, do not have the leave to approach 
these jurors. 
 
  If one of the three jurors were a deliberating 
juror, we might have a different situation, but each 
fortuitously was an alternate juror.  Each said they 
did not speak to anybody else and juror number six -- I 
wish I knew her last name, I mean no disrespect to her, 
I believe her first name is Sheila -- indicated that it 
would have no impact on her. 
 
  What I will do, I will in camera ask each of them 
what they said and seal it, so the Circuit has it. 
 
App. at 686-87.  Bertoli's attorney then asked the court to 
interview other jurors as well.  He made no objection to the 
decision to conduct in-camera interviews and he did not request 
to be present.  Only after receiving the transcript of the in 
camera discussion did Bertoli object to the procedure. 
 The contemporaneous objection rule, that the failure 
contemporaneously to assert a right constitutes a waiver of that 
right, applies to a criminal defendant's right to be present 
under Rule 43.  Gagnon, 470 U.S. at 529, 105 S.Ct. at 1486; 
United States v. Brown, 923 F.2d at 112 (failure to assert right 
under Rule 43 constitutes waiver); United States v. Doe, 964 F.2d 
157, 159 (2d Cir.) ("waiver by counsel of a defendant's right to 
  
be present during the proceedings is valid when made in the 
presence of the defendant"), cert. denied, ____ U.S. ____, 113 
S.Ct. 628 (1992); cf. Government of Virgin Islands v. Williams, 
892 F.2d 305, 309 (3d Cir. 1989) (under contemporaneous objection 
rule, a party must object contemporaneously "to any matter 
believed to be erroneous, at peril of relinquishing the 
opportunity to challenge that matter on appeal"), cert. denied, 
495 U.S. 949, 110 S.Ct. 2211 (1990). 
  A defendant need not be warned expressly of his or her 
rights under Rule 43, nor must a waiver exist on the record.  
Rather, the simple failure to assert the right constitutes a 
waiver.  In Gagnon itself, the trial court had announced its 
intention to proceed with in camera discussions, and called a 
recess.  The defendants lodged no objections, then or afterwards, 
and the Supreme Court held that the failure to assert the right 
constituted a waiver.  Gagnon, 470 U.S. at 523, 529, 105 S.Ct. at 
1483, 1486.  Similarly, in Provenzano, we held that a defendant's 
failure to object contemporaneously to the court's assertion of 
an intent to hold an in camera conference without the defendant 
present constituted a waiver of any right.  620 F.2d at 998, 
cited with approval in Gagnon, 470 U.S. at 528 n.2, 105 S.Ct. at 
1485 n.2. 
 In this case, the trial court announced its intention 
to conduct in camera interviews without Bertoli or his counsel 
present, and Bertoli failed to assert any right under Rule 43.7  
                     
7
.  Relying on the transcript that the court ultimately released 
to him, Bertoli contends that even if he consented to in camera 
  
Bertoli nonetheless argues that, based on the transcript, the 
trial court only stated an intention to interview the alternate 
jurors and that he was not appraised of the court's intention to 
interview Juror Six.  In light of the colloquy quoted in the 
text, this argument is without merit.  It is clear that the court 
was contemplating interviewing all four jurors.8 
  
c.  Sixth Amendment 
 Bertoli also contends that the in camera ex parte 
interviews violated his right to effective assistance of counsel, 
since the refusal to allow counsel to be present at the 
conference constituted a constructive denial of the right to an 
attorney.  The Sixth Amendment provides every criminal defendant 
with the right to the effective assistance of counsel.  While it 
may have been preferable to have counsel present, see Aiello, 771 
F.2d at 630, and while the district court should have released 
(..continued) 
interviews, he did not consent to the court's method of 
conducting the interviews.  It is unfortunate that the trial 
judge did not release the transcript of the interviews 
immediately after the in camera conference.  This does not, 
however, change our analysis.  Our review of the transcript 
reveals that the court did what it told counsel it would do.  
What occurs at a conference is not preordained; the possibility 
of an unforseen revelation always exists.  By waiving his right 
to be present at the conference, Bertoli took the risk of what 
might occur.  At any rate, we are satisfied that the record 
supports the court's credibility determinations. 
8
.  At any rate, any error the district court may have committed 
was harmless.  It is unclear what Bertoli would have gained by 
being present, other than the opportunity to request again more 
extensive questioning.  On the other hand his presence may have 
stifled the jurors.  Overall, we see no prejudice to Bertoli from 
the procedure followed. 
  
the transcript promptly, we cannot say that Bertoli was 
prejudiced by the trial court's decision to conduct the 
interviews without counsel present.  In the first place, the 
responsibility of making the credibility determinations rested 
with the court, not counsel.  See United States v. Marrero, 904 
F.2d 251, 261-62 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1000, 111 
S.Ct. 561 (1990).  Second, counsel did not ask to be present at 
the interviews when the court announced his intention to hold 
them.  Finally, the interviews were transcribed and the 
transcript was made available to counsel -- albeit belatedly -- 
in time for counsel to move for a new trial before the district 
court itself.  See Aiello, 771 F.2d at 629-30 (failure of court 
to include counsel in in camera discussion with jury constituted 
harmless error when court held second hearing with counsel 
present). 
 
3.  Providing written transcripts to jury 
 At several points during deliberations, the jury sent 
notes to the trial court requesting certain testimony.  Each time 
the court overruled Bertoli's objection and provided the 
transcripts to the jury.  It appears that the jury ultimately 
asked for and obtained the transcripts of the entire testimony of 
12 witnesses. 
 Bertoli argues that the trial court erred in providing 
the jury with these transcripts.  He contends that by acceding to 
the jury's request, the trial court permitted the risk that the 
jury would overvalue the written transcripts at the expense of 
  
the other evidence.  He also points to the risks involved should 
a jury misread the transcripts or rely on one juror's 
interpretation. 
 Although we never have ruled on the propriety of 
providing juries with written transcripts of testimony, we have 
held that "[a] trial court has broad discretion in deciding 
whether to accede to a jury's request for a reading of 
testimony."  United States v. Zarintash, 736 F.2d 66, 69-70 (3d 
Cir. 1984) (emphasis added); United States v. Chrzanowski, 502 
F.2d 573, 577 (3d Cir. 1974) (same); United States v. Rabb, 453 
F.2d 1012, 1013 (3d Cir. 1971) (same); United States v. 
Chicarelli, 445 F.2d 1111, 1114-15 (3d Cir. 1971) (same).  The 
discretion is limited by two considerations, however:  (1) such 
requests may slow the trial where the requested testimony is 
lengthy; (2) when read only a portion of testimony, the jury may 
give undue weight to that portion.  Still, unless a trial court's 
refusal to read back testimony is supported by one of these two 
concerns, "a trial judge abuses his discretion" by denying the 
request.  Zarintash, 736 F.2d at 70 (citing Rabb, 453 F.2d at 
1013-14). 
 We agree with Bertoli that the providing of written 
trial transcripts may pose dangers not present when the trial 
court reads portions of the transcripts to the jury.  For 
example, when the request is to have testimony read back, the 
court can ensure that all the jurors are present when the 
testimony is read.  In the privacy of the jury room, this cannot 
be done.  But on the other hand, reading back testimony poses 
  
dangers not present when the jury is provided transcripts.  For 
instance, an inattentive juror may be persuaded unduly by an 
attentive juror's version of the read-back testimony.  Moreover, 
a juror's mishearing of read-back testimony cannot be corrected 
by a second look.  All in all, we do not believe that the 
distinctions between reading testimony to the jury and providing 
the jury with copies of written testimony are sufficient so that 
we should apply different considerations when reviewing 
determinations by the court to supply them.9  Cf. Zarintash, 736 
F.2d at 70 (implying that distinction between providing written 
transcripts and reading testimony is a distinction of form, not 
substance).  Therefore, we join the other courts that have 
considered this issue and hold that a trial court's decision 
whether or not to supply the jury with copies of written 
transcripts may be reversed only when it constitutes an abuse of 
discretion.  See,  e.g., United States v. Edwards, 968 F.2d 1148, 
1152 (11th Cir. 1992) ("district court has broad discretion in 
determining whether to grant or deny a jury's request to read a 
portion of the trial transcript"), cert. denied, ____ U.S. ____, 
113 S.Ct. 1006 (1993); United States v. Lujan, 936 F.2d 406, 411 
(9th Cir. 1991) (trial court's decision to provide trial 
transcript to jury reviewed for abuse of discretion); United 
States v. Betancourt, 838 F.2d 168, 175 (6th Cir.) ("the 
                     
9
.  We are not to be understood to be holding that a court when 
presented with a request for written transcripts from a jury is 
obliged to require their preparation if they are not otherwise 
available.  In this case daily transcripts were prepared. 
  
furnishing of transcripts to a jury is generally well within the 
district court's discretion"), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1013, 108 
S.Ct. 1748 (1988); Government of Canal Zone v. Scott, 502 F.2d 
566, 570 (5th Cir. 1974) (same).  Any other rule would constitute 
an unwarranted intrusion into the district court's discretion to 
adapt procedures to the situation in the case before it.  See, 
e.g., United States v. Angelo, 153 F.2d 247, 251-52 (3d Cir. 
1946) ("It would be both impossible and undesirable to delimit 
strictly the powers of the trial judge and to set detailed 
regulations for the conduct of every case.").   
 Of course, in exercising its discretion to provide 
written transcripts of testimony, the trial court must be 
cognizant of dangers that may be present in the particular case.  
For instance, in their review of a transcript, jurors may seize 
upon an answer without focusing on limitations or qualifications 
developed during cross-examination.  If the request poses such a 
danger, the court should give the attorneys an opportunity to 
make sure that the transcript incorporates all appropriate and 
relevant aspects of the requested testimony.  Moreover, although 
it did not happen in this case, the district court generally 
should accompany the transcripts with a cautionary instruction to 
focus on the entire testimony and evidence. 
 We further hold that in this case, the trial court did 
not abuse its discretion by providing the jury with the written 
transcripts. The jury requested the transcripts of 12 witnesses, 
so the danger of giving undue weight to particular testimony was 
minimized.  Moreover, Bertoli fails to specify a single example 
  
in the procedure the court followed that presented a 
particularized danger of prejudice.  Further, the district court 
adequately informed the jury that it was to consider the entire 
body of evidence submitted in the case, and not to emphasize 
unduly one piece of evidence over another.10  See app. at 223-24 
n.166.  See also Betancourt, 838 F.2d at 175 (no abuse of 
discretion where "the judge carefully informed the jury, in 
standard terms, that all of the evidence was to be weighed, and 
no undue credence was to be given to any single part of it").   
 
B.  Sentencing Issues 
 Bertoli raises several issues concerning the propriety 
of his sentence which we will address in turn.  Initially we 
observe that because the obstruction of justice activities that 
are the subject of Count Six of the Indictment occurred in 1990, 
and because the conspiracy charged in Count Three occurred 
between 1983 and 1992, the sentence is governed by the United 
States Sentencing Guidelines, which apply to all federal crimes 
committed after November 1, 1987.  See United States v. Moscony, 
                     
10
.  The court informed the jury: 
 
 All of the evidence, regardless of whether I've 
referred to it, regardless of whether counsel referred 
to it in their summations, must be considered by you.  
It makes no difference whether the evidence was offered 
by the [Government] or by [Bertoli].  It was all 
evidence and all of it should be considered by you to 
the extent it helps you decide the issues in this case. 
 
App. at 224 n.166. 
  
927 F.2d 742, 754 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,      U.S.     , 111 
S.Ct. 2812 (1991). 
 
1.  The district court's calculation of the sentence 
 The district court calculated Bertoli's total offense 
level by applying the "grouping" provisions of the 1993 
Sentencing Guidelines.  See United States v. Riviere, 924 F.2d 
1289, 1303 (3d Cir. 1991).  Section 3D1.1(a) directs the court to 
combine various counts of conviction into "distinct Groups of 
Closely Related Counts."11  The district court adopted the 
government's argument that the conduct charged in the two counts 
should be divided into three groups:  "Group [One] would consist 
of the three conspiracies to obstruct [F]ederal court proceedings 
as well as Count [Six].  Group [Two] would consist of the 
conspiracy to obstruct the [G]rand [J]ury [I]nvestigation.  Group 
                     
11
.  Although Bertoli was convicted only on two counts, the 
guidelines mandate that the court consider a count charging a 
conspiracy to commit two crimes as a conspiracy to commit crime A 
and a conspiracy to commit crime B.  The district court quoted 
the example given in the guidelines: 
 
 Example:  The defendant is convicted of two counts:  
conspiring to commit offenses A, B, and C, and 
committing offense A.  Treat this as if the defendant 
was convicted of (1) committing offense A; (2) 
conspiracy to commit offense A; (3) conspiracy to 
commit offense B; and (4) conspiracy to commit offense 
C.  Count (1) and count (2) are grouped together under 
§3D1.2(b).  Group the remaining counts, including the 
various acts cited by the conspiracy count that would 
constitute behavior of a substantive nature, according 
to the rules in this section. 
 
U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2, Application Note 8. 
 
  
Three would consist of the conspiracy to obstruct the SEC 
Investigation".  App. at 412 (quoting government Sentencing 
Memorandum at 77) (alterations in original).  The grouping 
guideline then directed the court to compute the offense level 
for each group separately, based on the most serious of the 
counts comprising the group.12   
 Because each group involved obstruction of justice, the 
district court applied section 2J1.2, the guideline covering that 
crime.  That guideline, however, contains a cross-reference, to 
be applied when a defendant's activity involved "obstructing the 
investigation or prosecution of a criminal offense."  Section 
2J1.2(c)(1).  In such a case, the court is to sentence the 
defendant as an accessory after the fact to the relevant criminal 
offenses, if that would result in a greater offense level.  In 
other words, if A's obstructionist activity consisted of lying 
under oath about whether B committed a bank robbery, A should be 
sentenced as an accessory after the fact to bank robbery.  
Section 2X3.1, the guideline for accessory after the fact, 
                     
12
.  Section 3D1.3 requires the court to: 
 
 Determine the offense level applicable to each of the 
Groups as follows: 
 
 (a)  In the case of counts grouped together pursuant to 
§ 3D1.2(a)-(c), the offense level applicable to a Group 
is the offense level, determined in accordance with 
Chapter Two and Parts A, B, and C of Chapter Three, for 
the most serious of the counts comprising the Group, 
i.e., the highest offense level of the counts in the 
Group. 
  
provides a base offense level of "6 levels lower than the offense 
level for the underlying offense."   
 The court, finding that Bertoli conspired to obstruct 
the criminal proceedings against him, applied the cross-reference 
provision.  Because the underlying crimes involved fraud, the 
court was referred first to section 2X3.1 and then to section 
2F1.1, the guideline covering fraud and deceit.  Under the fraud 
guideline, the court began with a base offense level of 6.  But, 
following the table set forth in section 2F1.1(b)(1), the court 
increased the offense level by 14, because it found the loss to 
be between $5 and $10 million.13  Applying other subsections of 
the fraud guideline, the court increased the offense level still 
further.14  The total offense level for Group One was computed to 
be 25. 
 The court similarly computed the offense levels for 
Groups Two and Three, also by applying the cross-reference 
provision of the obstruction of justice guideline.  The offense 
levels for each of those groups was 22. 
                     
13
.  Section 2F1.1(b)(1) provides that "[i]f the loss exceeded 
$2,000", the court should increase the offense level as described 
in the table.  Section (b)(1)(o) requires the court to increase 
the level by 14 if the loss was more than $5,000,000 but less 
than $10,000,000. 
14
.  Specifically, because the court found that the offense 
involved more than minimal planning, it increased the level by 2, 
pursuant to section 2F1.1(b)(2).  And, because the court found 
that the offense involved a "violation of [a] judicial or 
administrative order", it increased the level by an additional 2 
points pursuant to subsection (b)(3).  See also n.15, infra. 
  
 Finally, the court applied section 3D1.4, which 
provides the following when separate groups are involved: 
 [t]he combined offense level is determined by taking 
the offense level applicable to the Group with the 
highest level and increasing that offense level by the 
amount indicated in the following table: 
 
 Number of Units Increase in Offense Level 
  1    none 
  1 1/2   add 1 level 
  2    add 2 levels 
  2 1/2-3   add 3 levels 
  3 1/2-5   add 4 levels 
  more than 5  add 5 levels 
 
 In determining the number of Units for purposes of this 
section: 
 
 (a) Count as one Unit the Group with the highest 
offense level.  Count one additional Unit for each 
Group that is equally serious or from 1-4 levels less 
serious. 
 
Thus, the court began with the offense level applicable to Group 
One, and increased that level by 3, 1 level for Group One itself 
and 2 additional levels because the offense levels for Groups Two 
and Three were "from 1-4 levels less serious" than Group One.  
Accordingly, the district court arrived at a total offense level 
of 28.15 
                     
15
.  In its Opinion, the district court provided the following 
explanation of its computation of the Total Offense Level: 
 
 Total Offense Level 
 
The total offense level of 28 is calculated as follows: 
 
(1) Group One Base Offense Level 
 
-- Applicable Guideline:  § 2J1.2(c), which by cross-
reference to § 2X3.1, requires the offense level to be 
calculated as if Bertoli was an accessory after the 
fact to the offenses being prosecuted in the Redacted 
  
2.  Proper applicable Guidelines Manual 
(..continued) 
Second Superseding Indictment because he conspired to 
obstruct the investigations and prosecutions of those 
offenses.  This requires the use of § 2F1.1 
 
-- Base Level 
  § 2F1.1(a)   6 
-- Upward adjustment pursuant to 
  § 2F1.1(b)(1)(o) for loss between 
  $5 and $10 million  14 
 
-- Upward adjustment pursuant to 
  §2F1.1(b)(2) for more than  
  minimal planning   2 
 
-- Upward adjustment pursuant to  
  §2F1.1(b)(3)(B) for violation of 
  a judicial or administrative order 2 
             ___ __ 
 SUBTOTAL     24 
 
-- Downward adjustment pursuant to 
  § 2X3.1    6 
             _____ 
 BASE OFFENSE LEVEL   18 
 
(2) Upward adjustment pursuant to  
  § 2J1.7 for committing an offense 
  while on pretrial release 3 
 
(3) Upward adjustment pursuant to  
  § 3B1.1(a) for having an aggrava- 
  ting role in the offense  4 
 
             _____ 
GROUP ONE OFFENSE LEVEL    25 
 
(4) Upward adjustment pursuant to 
  § 3D1.4 for multiple offenses 3 
  (taking into account 
  Groups Two and Three)        _____ 
 
TOTAL OFFENSE LEVEL     28 
 
App. at 444. 
  
 Bertoli first contends that the district court's 
application of the cross reference in the 1993 Guideline for 
obstruction of justice violated his right to be free from ex post 
facto punishments, guaranteed by Article I, § 9 of the United 
States Constitution.  We exercise plenary review over the 
district court's conclusion.  United States v. Moscony, 927 F.2d 
at 754 n.17. 
 Generally, the sentencing court must apply the 
Guidelines Manual in effect at the time of sentencing. 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3553(a)(4),(5); U.S.S.G. § 1B1.11(a).  However, sometimes this 
rule gives way to constitutional considerations.  Specifically, 
"where such retroactivity results in harsher penalties, Ex Post 
Facto Clause problems arise, and courts must apply the earlier 
version."  United States v. Kopp, 951 F.2d 521, 526 (3d Cir. 
1991) (citing Miller v. Florida, 482 U.S. 423, 107 S.Ct. 2446 
(1987)); see also United States v. Seligsohn, 981 F.2d 1418, 1424 
(3d Cir. 1992); United States v. Pollen, 978 F.2d 78, 90 (3d Cir. 
1992), cert. denied, ____ U.S. ____, 113 S.Ct. 2332 (1993); 
United States v. McAllister, 927 F.2d 136, 138 n.2 (3d Cir.), 
cert. denied,      U.S.     , 112 S.Ct. 111 (1991).  Bertoli 
contends that the court should have used the 1989 Guidelines 
Manual to calculate the base offense level, because a substantive 
change to the commentary to the obstruction of justice guideline, 
resulting in more severe penalties, took effect after the crime 
of Count Six was completed.  We agree. 
 The district court failed to consider this argument, 
because, in determining which Guideline Manual to apply, it 
  
grouped the conduct charged in Counts Three and Six, and treated 
it as one course of conduct.  Apparently, the district court 
believed that if the conduct is grouped together, there is no 
need to assess the counts independently to determine whether ex 
post facto clause considerations arise.  Thus, although finding 
that the conduct of Count Six occurred in 1990, the court 
nevertheless held that the crimes were completed in 1992, when 
the conspiracy's last overt act occurred.  The court reasoned 
that "the only other Guidelines Manual that could be used [other 
than the Manual in effect at the time of sentencing] is the 1 
November 1991 Manual . . . , which was the manual in effect on 
the date the Second Superseding Indictment was returned and the 
conspiracies to obstruct justice described in Count Three 
ceased."  App. at 405.16   Because there is no substantive 
difference between the 1991 and 1993 Guidelines Manuals, the 
court applied the 1993 Guidelines Manual. 
 We expressly have disapproved the practice of combining 
different counts of the indictment when determining which 
Guidelines Manual applies.  See Seligsohn, 981 F.2d at 1424.  In 
Seligsohn, some of the offenses concluded before November 1, 
1989, while others took place after that date.  On November 1, 
1989, amendments to the guidelines took effect "and provided for 
the imposition of heavier penalties than those previously in 
                     
16
.  On appeal, the government does not endorse the district 
court's decision to combine Counts Three and Six for the purpose 
of determining which Manual applies.  Rather, the government's 
sole argument is that the 1989 Manual is not more favorable to 
Bertoli than the 1993 Manual. 
  
effect."  Id. at 1424.  The district court nevertheless applied 
the post-1989 Guidelines Manual to all the counts.  On appeal, 
the government supported the ruling based on a principle set 
forth in the Sentencing Guidelines called the one-book rule.  The 
one-book rule provides that "only one set of Guidelines should be 
used in calculating the applicable total 'as a cohesive and 
integrated whole.'"  Id. (quoting government's Brief).  We 
rejected the proposition that the one-book rule overrides ex post 
facto concerns: 
 That so-called rule is inconsistent with United States 
v. Kopp and other cases in this Court.  Focusing on ex 
post facto considerations, those cases have prohibited 
the application of more stringent penalties than were 
authorized at the time of the offense.  Consequently, 
we expressly disapprove of the 'one book' practice as 
in conflict with the Kopp opinion. 
 
Id.  The fact that various counts of an indictment are grouped 
cannot override ex post facto concerns.  Id.  Therefore, the 
trial court erred by failing independently to analyze which 
Guidelines Manual should have applied to the conduct charged in 
Count Three.  Our independent analysis of the question leads us 
to conclude that the 1989 guidelines apply to Bertoli's 
sentence.17 
                     
17
.  A policy statement in the guidelines provides that "[t]he 
Guidelines Manual in effect on a particular date shall be applied 
in its entirety.  The court shall not apply, for example, one 
guideline section from one edition of the Guidelines Manual and 
another guideline section from a different edition of the 
Guidelines Manual."  U.S.S.G. § 1B1.11.  In Seligsohn, we said 
that upon remand, "before grouping the various offenses to 
determine the score, the district court must first apply the 
applicable Guidelines for each offense." 981 F.2d at 1426.  We do 
not read this language to be in conflict with the policy 
statement.  Rather, when ex post facto clause issues arise, while 
  
 Section 2J1.2, the guideline for obstruction of 
justice, provides in both the 1989 and 1993 versions: 
 §2J1.2. Obstruction of Justice 
   (a)  Base Offense Level:  12 
 *  *  * 
   (c) Cross Reference 
    (1) If the offense involved 
obstructing the investigation or 
prosecution of a criminal 
offense, apply §2X3.1 (Accessory 
After the Fact) in respect to 
that criminal offense, if the 
resulting offense level is 
greater than that determined 
above. 
 
The district court found that Bertoli's obstructionist conduct 
involved attempting to conceal the predicate offenses to the 
racketeering acts with which he was charged.  See app. at 423.  
The court therefore applied the cross-reference provision of the 
guideline, which in turn directed it to the guideline for fraud. 
 While the guideline provision itself is identical in 
both the 1989 and 1993 guidelines, the commentary was amended 
(..continued) 
the one-book rule cannot apply to compel application of the later 
Manual to all counts, it certainly can compel application of the 
earlier Manual.  Furthermore, in this case the government does 
not argue that we should apply a Guideline Manual later than the 
1989 Guidelines Manual to either Group 2 or Group 3 if we apply 
the 1989 Manual to Group one.  See n.16, supra.  Therefore the 
one-book rule should be applied here and the 1989 Guidelines 
Manual used as to all groups.  We note that it is possible that 
changes in the guidelines after an offense might both help and 
hurt the defendant.  In such a situation a defendant might not be 
able to object to the use of a Guideline Manual adopted after an 
offense on ex post facto grounds if overall the amendments 
favored him.  But we are not concerned with that situation here. 
  
effective November 1, 1991.  The "Background" section of the 
commentary to the 1989 guidelines stated:  "Because the conduct 
covered by this guideline is frequently part of an effort to 
assist another person to escape punishment for a crime he has 
committed, an alternative reference to the guideline for 
accessory after the fact is made." (Emphasis added).  The amended 
commentary mandates application of the cross-reference provision 
whenever the defendant obstructed justice as "part of an effort 
to avoid punishment for an offense that the defendant has 
committed or to assist another person to escape punishment for an 
offense."  (Emphasis added).  Relying on caselaw interpreting the 
1989 guideline, Bertoli argues that the sentencing court was 
prohibited from using the cross-reference when the defendant's 
conduct was directed to avoid punishment to himself.  The 
government responds that the 1991 revision only clarified the 
guideline, and the particular circumstances referred to in the 
1989 commentary were not intended to be all-inclusive.   
 We begin our analysis with several propositions.  
First, when a crime is covered by the Sentencing Guidelines, the 
sentence is computed based not only on the relevant guidelines, 
but also on the Sentencing Commission's policy statements and 
commentary.  See, e.g., Stinson v. United States, ____ U.S. ____, 
____, 113 S.Ct. 1913, 1916 (1993); United States v. Hightower, 25 
F.3d 182, 184 (3d Cir. 1994), petition for cert. filed Aug. 29, 
1994.  Second, although the principle has been disputed until 
only recently, it is now settled that the commentary to the 
guidelines is binding on federal courts as controlling law unless 
  
it either (1) violates the Constitution or a federal statute or 
(2) "is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the [guideline]."  
Stinson, ____ U.S. at ____, 113 S.Ct. at 1919 (quoting Bowles v. 
Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414, 65 S.Ct. 1215, 1217 
(1945)).18  Third, despite the fact that proposed amendments to 
the guidelines themselves must be submitted to Congress for 
review, see 28 U.S.C. § 994(p), "[a]mended commentary is binding 
on the federal courts even though it is not reviewed by 
Congress".  Stinson, ____ U.S. at ____, 113 S.Ct. at 1919 
(emphasis added).  Finally, "prior judicial constructions of a 
particular guideline cannot prevent the Commission from adopting 
a conflicting interpretation" that is consistent with the 
Constitution and federal law and when "the guideline . . . will 
bear the construction."  Id. at     , 113 S.Ct. at 1919. 
 Applying these principles to the issue before us, it 
becomes clear that commentary to the guidelines is to be treated 
(except in narrow instances) as law, that is, it must be read in 
conjunction with the guideline and policy statements as the law 
governing the case.  This means that, in the wake of Stinson, 
subsequent amendments to the commentary -- while binding on the 
court -- may, just like the guidelines themselves, present ex 
post facto problems when applied retrospectively.  See, e.g., 
United States v. Diaz, 26 F.3d 1533, 1544 (11th Cir. 1994) 
                     
18
.  In Stinson, the Supreme Court, after considering various 
analogies, concluded that "the guidelines are the equivalent of 
legislative rules adopted by federal agencies."  Id. at     , 113 
S.Ct. at 1919. 
  
(sentence based on commentary enacted after conviction but prior 
to sentence may run afoul of ex post facto clause); United States 
v. Carroll, 6 F.3d 735, 747 n.9 (11th Cir. 1993) ("in light of 
the Supreme Court's decision in Stinson . . . , application of an 
intervening Guidelines interpretation by commentary promulgated 
after the offense could run afoul of the Ex Post Facto Clause") 
(citation omitted), cert. denied, ____ U.S. ____, 114 S.Ct. 1234 
(1994); United States v. Wilson, 993 F.2d 214, 216 (11th Cir. 
1993) (same). 
 Of course, an amendment to the commentary does not 
necessarily substantively alter the guideline itself -- even when 
its application results in a sentence more severe than might 
otherwise have been imposed.  Rather, "amendments that clarify, 
rather than substantively change, the guidelines do not present 
ex post facto issues when they are applied retrospectively."  
United States v. Webster, 996 F.2d 209, 211 n.4 (9th Cir. 1993) 
(quoting United States v. Scarano, 975 F.2d 580, 587 (9th Cir. 
1992) (internal citations omitted)); see also U.S.S.G. § 1B1.11 
("if a court applies an earlier edition of the Guidelines Manual, 
the court shall consider subsequent amendments, to the extent 
that such amendments are clarifying rather than substantive 
changes").  Because the commentary and the guideline both are 
binding, however, we must not be too quick to hold that an 
amendment to the commentary is merely a clarification.  Rather, 
our role is to look at the guidelines manual in effect at the 
time the crime was committed and ask whether, as matter of 
construction, the guideline and commentary in effect at that time 
  
is really consistent with the amended manual.  If the amended 
commentary "does not overrule prior constructions of the 
Guideline but instead confirms our reading of the Guideline", 
there is no ex post facto concern.  Diaz, 26 F.3d at 1545 (citing 
Carroll, 6 F.3d at 746 n.9).  If, though, the amended commentary 
does overrule prior judicial constructions of the guideline, ex 
post facto clause problems become more serious. 
 In this case, the 1989 commentary is clear: "Because 
the conduct covered by this guideline is frequently part of an 
effort to assist another person to escape punishment for a crime 
he has committed, an alternative reference to the guideline for 
accessory after the fact is made." (Emphasis added).  The 
government's argument that the commentary simply provides one 
example of when the cross-reference can be used is at odds with 
the plain meaning of the language.  The commentary does not 
purport to give an example; it explains how and when the cross-
reference should be applied.  Thus, even though the guideline 
itself refers only to "obstructing the investigation or 
prosecution of a criminal offense", when that language is read in 
conjunction with the commentary, the court is told to use the 
cross-reference when the defendant's obstructionist activity was 
directed at assisting another person to escape punishment for a 
crime. 
 Our reading is consistent with other courts' 
interpretations.  The several courts that have addressed the 
issue under the 1989 guidelines have reached a single conclusion 
-- that the cross-reference does not apply when a defendant's 
  
obstructionist activity is intended to protect only himself.  For 
instance, in United States v. Huppert, 917 F.2d 507 (11th Cir. 
1990), the defendant had attempted to persuade two witnesses to 
his crimes to identify someone else to the grand jury.  The Court 
of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, after finding that the 
obstructionist act "is an act directed at protecting [the 
defendant] from being punished", cited the 1989 commentary and 
held that use of the cross-reference was improper.  Id. at 510-
11.  Similarly, in United States v. Berkowitz, 712 F. Supp. 707, 
709 (N.D. Ill. 1989), the defendant, while facing mail fraud and 
tax fraud charges in the Northern District of Illinois, was 
arrested and charged with stealing and destroying documents that 
he knew were material to that prosecution.  The government sought 
to use section 2J1.2's cross-reference, but the court declined.  
It reasoned: 
 Applying §2X3.1 in the instant case would result in 
treating Berkowitz as an accessory to his own alleged 
tax fraud and mail fraud.  The official comments to 
§2J1.2 indicate that such an application of §2X3.1 is 
not appropriate.  Therein, the Commission explains that 
§2X3.1 is applied in obstruction of justice cases 
[b]ecause the conduct covered by the [obstruction of 
justice] guideline is frequently part of the effort to 
assist another person to escape punishment for a crime 
he committed.  Since Berkowitz did not commit 
obstruction of justice to assist another person, §2X3.1 
is inapplicable. 
 
Id. at 709 (quoting commentary) (alterations in original).  See 
also United States v. Pierson, 946 F.2d 1044, 1048 (4th Cir. 
1991) (applying identical reasoning to section 2J1.3(c), the 
guideline for perjury and subornation of perjury); cf. United 
States v. Curry, 977 F.2d 1042, 1059 (7th Cir. 1992) (rejecting 
  
the defendant's argument based on Huppert and Pierson because the 
defendant "was clearly trying to protect others, and not himself 
. . . "), cert. denied, ____ U.S. ____, 113 S.Ct. 1357 (1993).19  
Thus, this is not a case where the commentary is in accord with 
prior constructions of the guideline.  See Diaz, 26 F.3d at 1545. 
 These interpretations of the 1989 guideline and 
commentary are hardly surprising.  After all, use of the cross-
reference in this case (and in others like it) enabled the court 
to sentence Bertoli as an accessory after the fact to the crimes 
for which he was charged and acquitted as a principal.  While the 
"real offense" approach of the guidelines certainly permits the 
court to consider such facts in computing the sentence, see 
United States v. Ryan, 866 F.2d 604, 609 (3d Cir. 1989), such an 
interpretation is hardly the most obvious reading of the 1989 
guideline, particularly in light of the commentary.  Moreover, it 
is at least anomalous to hold -- in the absence of explicit 
direction such as that now provided in the amended commentary -- 
that the defendant could be convicted as both a principal and an 
accessory after the fact to his or her own crime.  As the court 
reasoned in Huppert: 
 We agree with the district court's conclusion that a 
sentencing court 'is permitted to look beyond the four 
corners of the charge to the underlying conduct.'  That 
                     
19
.  In United States v. Jamison, 996 F.2d 698 (4th Cir. 1993), 
the court noted that "[i]n 1991, the Guidelines Commission 
amended the commentary on which both the Pierson and Huppert 
courts relied in a manner which casts doubt upon the continued 
validity of those decisions."  Id. at 701 n.3.  However, because 
the court distinguished those cases, it "reserve[d] for another 
day a decision on the impact of the amended commentary on our 
precedent."  Id. 
  
practice is clearly permissible under the guidelines.  
However, under the guidelines, relevant conduct is 
incorporated into the base offense level by a 
prescribed process. . . . Section 2J1.2(c)(1) provides 
a specific method by which a court may consider conduct 
outside the offense of conviction.  That method is 
consistent with our understanding of the law of 
principals and accessories. 
 
Huppert, 917 F.2d at 511 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).20 
 In other words, the amended commentary (while certainly 
not violative of the Constitution or federal law) is in accord 
neither with the prior case law nor an obvious reading of the 
guideline.  Therefore, we hold that the 1991 amendment to the 
commentary is not a clarifying amendment but, rather, a 
substantive change.  This means that the district court should 
have applied the 1989 Guidelines Manual, and should not have used 
                     
20
.  The government argues that our interpretation would lead to 
absurd results, because "low-level conspirators in this scheme . 
. . who assisted Bertoli in hiding his illegal millions, would be 
eligible to receive a base offense level as high as 20 . . . 
while Bertoli, the mastermind of the scheme, would be limited to 
a base offense level of 12."  Appellee Br. at 39.  Of course, 12 
is the base level for obstruction of justice without use of the 
cross reference.  The government neglects to point out, however, 
that Bertoli would be chargeable and answerable for the entire 
underlying scheme, whereas the low-level conspirator may not be.  
See, e.g., United States v. Collado, 975 F.2d 985, 992 (3d Cir. 
1992) (liability of defendant for co-conspirator's conduct 
depends "upon the degree of the defendant's involvement in the 
conspiracy  and, of course, reasonable foreseeability with 
respect to the conduct of others within the conspiracy").  The 
point of the cross-reference is to say to someone who, for 
example, lies for another:  we're going to treat you as though 
you actually helped that person commit the crime you're now 
helping him get away with.  In any event the cases and principles 
we cite compel our result. 
  
the cross-reference provision of the obstruction of justice 
guideline.21 
 Because by using the 1993 Guidelines Manual, the trial 
court imposed a sentence in excess of what would have been 
permissible under the 1989 Manual, the sentence imposed violated 
Bertoli's right against ex post facto punishment.  The sentence 
                     
21
.  We are aware that the Sentencing Commission has described 
the amendment as clarifying.  United States Sentencing Commission 
1993 Guidelines Manual, app. C, page 233-34, § 401.  But this 
circumstance does not change our result.  In the first place, we 
have rejected the proposition that the Sentencing Commission's 
description of an amendment as "clarifying" is entitled to 
substantial weight.  United States v. Menon, 24 F.3d 550, 567 (3d 
Cir. 1994).  Moreover, the Commission's description comes in the 
face of a settled interpretation of the guideline and therefore 
is entitled to little weight.  See United States v. Menon, 24 
F.3d at 567 ("[W]e never have held that a 'clarifying' amendment 
can be used to interpret an earlier guideline when applying the 
amendment would punish the defendant more harshly than he would 
have been punished under the court's independent interpretation 
of the pre-amendment language."  Rather, our own independent 
interpretation of the pre-amendment language is controlling. 
 
 To analogize, in McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 
350, 107 S.Ct. 2875 (1987), the Supreme Court held that a person 
could not be prosecuted under the mail fraud statute for fraud 
that only causes intangible loss, such as depriving the public of 
honest government.  In 1988, Congress responded to the Court's 
decision by passing a statute that defines "scheme or artifice to 
defraud" as including "scheme[s] or artifice to deprive another 
of the intangible right of honest services."  18 U.S.C. § 1346.  
Of course, simply by adopting this language, Congress could not 
have the law applied retroactively.  Rather, applying the revised 
statute to conduct occurring after McNally but prior to the 
revision clearly would have violated the ex post facto clause.  
See, e.g., United States v. Schwartz, 924 F.2d 410, 418 (2d Cir. 
1991).  Had Congress described the statute as "clarifying", it 
would have been of no moment.  That description could not 
displace the fact that the Supreme Court had ruled on the meaning 
of the pre-revision language.  In the instant case, the 
Commission's description comes in the face of a settled 
interpretation of the guideline provision.  The use of the word 
"clarifying" cannot change this simple fact. 
  
therefore must be vacated and the matter remanded for re-
sentencing under the 1989 Manual.22 
 
3.  Permissibility of the fine 
 Bertoli next contends that the district court erred in 
departing upward from the guideline maximum fine of $125,000 to a 
fine of $7 million.  The district court arrived at this figure as 
the amount necessary to disgorge Bertoli of illegal profits he 
keeps hidden in foreign bank accounts.  Bertoli argues that the 
facts upon which the district court based its decision simply are 
not supported by the record. 
 Generally a defendant must be sentenced within the 
applicable guideline range.  However, if the court "finds that 
there exists an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, 
or to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the 
Sentencing Commission in formulating the guidelines, that should 
result in a sentence different from that described", the court 
may depart from the guideline range accordingly.  18 U.S.C. § 
3553(b); United States v. Kikumura, 918 F.2d 1084, 1098 (3d Cir. 
1990).23   Conversely, if the Sentencing Commission adequately 
                     
22
.  Because the district court was incorrect in its application 
of the cross-reference, the fraud guideline should not have been 
applied.  Therefore, we need not address Bertoli's argument that 
the district court's calculation of the loss under the fraud 
guideline was erroneous. 
23
.  While this case involves a departure from the applicable 
fine range rather than the incarceration range, we previously 
have held that this is a distinction without a difference.  
United States v. Seale, 20 F.3d 1279, 1287 (3d Cir. 1994) (citing 
United States v. Graham, 946 F.2d 19, 21 (4th Cir. 1991)).  Thus, 
  
took all the relevant factors into account in determining the 
sentence, the court may not depart.   
 Our review over a district court's decision to depart 
upward is divided into three tiers.  First, we exercise plenary 
review over the district court's determination that the 
Sentencing Guidelines have not adequately taken a particular 
factor into account.  United States v. Uca, 867 F.2d 783, 786 (3d 
Cir. 1989).  "Of course, the circumstances relied upon must in 
fact exist in the case under consideration" in order to uphold 
the departure.  Kikumura, 918 F.2d at 1098.  In reviewing 
findings of fact, we employ the clearly erroneous standard of 
review.  Finally, we must determine whether the sentence imposed 
was reasonable, that is, whether the factors on which the court 
relied and the degree of the departure, were appropriate.  In 
this determination, "the district courts are entitled to exercise 
a substantial amount of discretion."  United States v. Ryan, 866 
F.2d at 610; see also Kikumura, 918 F.2d at 1098 ("[a]t this 
stage of the inquiry, our review is deferential").  We will 
address these factors in turn. 
 
 a.  Taken into Consideration by the Sentencing Commission 
 Under the Sentencing Guidelines, the sentencing court 
"shall impose a fine in all cases, except where the defendant 
establishes that he is unable to pay and is not likely to become 
(..continued) 
we review both types of departures under the same analytical 
rubric. 
  
able to pay any fine."  U.S.S.G. § 5E1.2; United States v. Demes, 
941 F.2d 220, 223 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, ____ U.S. ____, 112 
S.Ct. 399 (1991).  The court is to consider an array of factors, 
including evidence of the defendant's ability to pay the fine,24 
any restitution or reparation that the defendant has made or is 
obligated to make, and "any other pertinent equitable 
considerations."  U.S.S.G. § 5E1.2(d).  "The amount of the fine 
should always be sufficient to ensure that the fine taken 
together with other sanctions imposed, is punitive."  U.S.S.G. § 
5E1.2(e).  The guideline provides a "fine table" which 
establishes a minimum and maximum fine based on the defendant's 
offense level.  For an offense level of 28 -- the offense level 
at which the district court arrived in this case -- the minimum 
fine is $12,500 and the maximum is $125,000.  U.S.S.G. § 
5E1.2(c)(3). 
 The district court found that in establishing the 
guideline range, the Sentencing Commission did not adequately 
take into account facts fitting the circumstances of this case.  
In so holding, the district court relied on the commentary 
                     
24
.  The court found that Bertoli was able to pay the fine, for 
the following reasons:  (1) Bertoli did not submit a financial 
disclosure form to the probation department; (2) Bertoli's home 
conservatively is valued in excess of $1,000,000; (3) in October, 
1983, Bertoli stashed millions of dollars in secret bank accounts 
in the Cayman Islands and other off-shore accounts; (4) Bertoli 
moved millions of dollars out of the Cayman Accounts into 
accounts in Andorra; and (5) Bertoli is in control of those funds 
in Andorra.  App. at 451-52.  While Bertoli does challenge the 
district court's conclusions as to his control over the Andorra 
funds, he seems not specifically to challenge the district 
court's finding that he is able to pay the fine. 
  
itself, which expresses the Commission's views on just this 
subject: 
 The Commission envisions that for most defendants, the 
maximum of the guideline fine range from subsection (c) 
will be at least twice the amount of gain or loss 
resulting from the offense.  Where, however, two times 
either the amount of gain to the defendant or the 
amount of loss caused by the offense exceeds the 
maximum of the fine guideline, an upward departure from 
the fine guideline may be warranted. 
 
The Commission's views are dispositive on this point.  See 
Kikumura, 918 F.2d at 1104 ("'In determining whether a 
circumstance was adequately taken into consideration [so as to 
preclude departure], the court shall consider only the sentencing 
guidelines, policy statements, and official commentary of the 
Sentencing Commission.'") (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)) 
(alterations in original).  Assuming the district court's 
findings are correct, this case involves precisely the type of 
situation warranting an upward departure contemplated by the 
Sentencing Commission.  The Commission contemplated the fine of 
$125,000 to be twice the amount of the gain, whereas the court 
found that Bertoli illegally profited and controls $7 million.  
Thus, the district court was correct in its conclusion that the 
facts it found warranted an upward departure. 
 
 b.  The district court's factual findings 
 We next address whether the district court's findings 
of fact are clearly erroneous.  As a preliminary matter, however, 
the record compels us to discuss the appropriate evidentiary 
standard. 
  
 In making its findings, the district court employed a 
standard of proof of "at least a preponderance of the evidence." 
App. at 372.  The court determined that it could consider hearsay 
statements it regarded as having "some minimal indicium of 
reliability."  App. at 372 n.233 (quoting United States v. 
Kikumura, 918 F.2d at 1102 (quotation omitted)).  In the court's 
view, two of the documents -- the Cahill Sentencing Affidavit and 
the 1993 Cannistraro Plea Allocution -- had "more than a 'minimal 
indicium of reliability'; they are strongly reliable sources."  
App. at 372 n.233. 
 Generally, courts may use the preponderance of the 
evidence standard of proof in sentencing hearings.  McMillan v. 
Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 91, 106 S.Ct. 2411, 2419 (1987); 
Kikumura, 918 F.2d at 1099; United States v. McDowell, 888 F.2d 
285, 291 (3d Cir. 1989).  This is because after a jury finds a 
defendant guilty, the presumption of innocence no longer applies, 
and the protections that form a corollary to that presumption 
become less important.  See, generally, Kikumura, 918 F.2d at 
1099-1100.  See also id. at 1100 (federal rules of evidence 
inapplicable at sentencing); United States v. Baylin, 696 F.2d 
1030, 1040 (3d Cir. 1982) (hearsay admissible at sentencing so 
long as it bears "some minimal indicium of reliability beyond 
mere allegation"). 
 In Kikumura, however, we distinguished between "run-of-
the-mill sentencing cases" and those in which the proposed 
departure is so great that the sentencing hearing "functions as 
'a tail which wags the dog of the substantive offense.'"  
  
Kikumura, 918 F.2d at 1100-01 (quoting McMillan, 477 U.S. at 88, 
106 S.Ct. at 2417).  In Kikumura itself, the sentencing court 
departed from the guideline maximum of 33 months to 30 years.  We 
held that in such an extreme context, "a court cannot reflexively 
apply the truncated procedures that are perfectly adequate for 
all of the more mundane, familiar sentencing determinations."  
Id. at 1101.  Rather, we held that facts supporting the departure 
must be found by clear and convincing evidence.  Hearsay, we 
said, only may be admitted in such cases when the court examines 
the "totality of the circumstances, including other corroborating 
evidence, and determines whether the hearsay declarations are 
reasonably trustworthy."  Id. at 1103.   
 We recently applied this heightened evidentiary 
standard to a district court's upward departure in determining 
the amount of a fine.  Seale, 20 F.3d at 1288.  There, the 
district court increased the defendant's fine from the guideline 
maximum of $250,000 to the statutory maximum of $1,750,000.  We 
held that this seven-fold increase was just the sort of "extreme 
context" that warranted use of the higher standard of proof.  
Such a context, we concluded, "requires that the district court 
use a clear and convincing standard of proof when finding 
supporting facts."  Id. at 1288 (citing Kikumura, 918 F.2d at 
1100-1102 and United States v. Townley, 929 F.2d 365 (8th Cir. 
1991)); see also United States v. St. Julian, 922 F.2d 563, 569 
n.1 (10th Cir. 1990) ("If the difference between the guideline 
range and the departure sentence is great, the trial court should 
consider the implications of that disparity in determining the 
  
appropriate standard of proof for the facts considered in 
sentencing."). 
 In this case, the court departed upward by a factor in 
excess of 50.  This is clearly the type of "extreme context" that 
requires more than the bare minimum of procedural protections.  
We hold, then, that factual conclusions justifying the departure 
must be supported by clear and convincing evidence and that, in 
order to be admissible, hearsay declarations must be reasonably 
trustworthy in light of the totality of the circumstances, 
including other corroborating evidence. 
 Accordingly we address whether the district court's 
findings are clearly erroneous in light of this evidentiary 
standard.  The court found made the following findings.  Bertoli, 
Cannistraro and Eisenberg each had companies created for them in 
the Cayman Islands by Sidney Coleman of Paget Brown & Co., to 
which they transferred profits obtained through the stock 
manipulation schemes.  In November 1989, the United States 
govenment requested from the Grand Court of the Cayman Islands 
documents and evidence concerning these accounts for use in the 
prosecution against Bertoli.  Soon thereafter, Bertoli began 
meeting with an Ernest Foster to discuss how to move the money 
and documents concerning the three companies from the Cayman 
Islands and therefore out of the government's reach.  In the wake 
of these discussions, Foster and two other persons travelled to 
the Principality of Andorra and opened an account with an 
Andorran bank in the name of Fosca, S.A.  In response to 
Bertoli's request, Foster ensured that Andorra had no treaty with 
  
the United States that would enable the latter to have access to 
the accounts.  Bertoli then met with Eisenberg and the two 
decided to move documents concerning the companies to Foster's 
control.  In 1990, the administration of the companies was 
transferred from Coleman to Foster.  The total amount of the 
funds over which Foster obtained control was $8,700,000.  Of that 
amount, $5,086,593.94 was from Cannistraro's company, 
$3,132,956.09 from Eisenberg's company, and $471,580.61 from 
Bertoli's company.  Foster arranged to have the funds transferred 
to the Fosca account.  The next year, at Bertoli's request, 
Foster took the relevant documents to Andorra and left them with 
an attorney. 
 The court further found that despite Eisenberg's and 
Cannistraro's respective plea agreements to forfeit their 
interests in the Andorran companies to the government, the 
government to date had collected only $789,083.89.  Finally, the 
court noted that, according to the presentence report, Bertoli 
does not deny having control over substantial funds.25  The court 
inferred from these facts that "as demonstrated by the 
Government, Bertoli retains control of the millions of dollars, 
forfeited to it by Eisenberg and Cannistraro, but removed by 
Bertoli to Andorra beyond its reach."  App. at 451.  Therefore, 
                     
25
.  Actually, the court's opinion states that Bertoli "takes no 
position regarding the Government's claim that 'Bertoli has 
access to millions of dollars in foreign bank accounts.'"  App. 
at 451 (quoting December 1, 1993 letter from Bertoli).  According 
to the government's brief and the presentence report, however, 
Bertoli only declined to deny having access to substantial funds. 
  
the court concluded, "[a]n upward departure is necessary in 
calculating the appropriate fine for Bertoli because the fine 
indicated by the Guidelines is inadequate to 'disgorge' the gain 
of Bertoli's criminal activities."  Id. 
 Our review of the record compels us to conclude that 
the court's findings are not supported by the record and 
therefore are clearly erroneous.  The evidence supporting the 
proposition that Bertoli controls the entire millions of dollars 
consists solely of Foster's trial testimony.  And his testimony 
simply cannot be read fairly to confirm the court's findings. 
Foster did testify that he received control of the funds, that he 
set up an account in Andorra, and even that he ensured that the 
United States "didn't have any treaties with or any previous 
precedent of going in and obtaining documents or information 
concerning bank accounts."  App. at 35.  But nothing he says 
indicates that Bertoli received control of the entire money or 
that Bertoli retains control of the funds.  While he testified 
that his contacts were with Bertoli rather than with Eisenberg or 
Cannistraro, he does not even purport to express the view that 
Bertoli was acting unilaterally.  Apparently, the court to reach 
its conclusions extrapolated from the fact that the government 
has obtained only partial payments from the two co-conspirators, 
and that Bertoli did not deny having control over substantial 
sums of money.  "A substantial amount of money" is not always 
equivalent to many millions, though.  And the court's assumption 
that because the government only collected part of Eisenberg's 
and Cannistraro's profits, Bertoli must control the rest is 
  
completely speculative.  While such speculation may have survived 
scrutiny under the preponderance of the evidence standard, it 
certainly cannot withstand scrutiny under the clear and 
convincing evidence standard.26  Accordingly, the district 
court's finding is clearly erroneous and must be vacated and the 
case must be remanded for recalculation of the fine.27  Because 
of this finding, we need not reach the third tier of a review of 
an upward departure, whether the extent of the departure was 
reasonable. 
 
4.  Reassignment to a different judge 
 Finally, Bertoli argues that in the event of a remand, 
the case should be reassigned to a different judge, "because of 
the district judge's extreme animus towards Mr. Bertoli."  
Appellant Br. at ii.  The government argues in response that 
Bertoli wants Judge Lechner recused solely because of his 
reputation as a "harsh" sentencer, and that "Bertoli's blatant 
attempt at judge-shopping should be rejected by this court." 
 This is not the first time Bertoli has sought Judge 
Lechner's recusal.  On November 2, 1989, Bertoli filed his first 
recusal motion.  Judge Lechner denied this motion on March 22, 
                     
26
.  Although, as noted above, the district court found that the 
Cahill sentencing affidavit and the Cannistraro plea allocution 
were highly reliable, there is no indication that those documents 
were relevant to the district court's finding that Bertoli 
controls $7 million.  
27
.  Of course, since, as detailed above, the district court's 
calculation of the offense level was erroneous, the guideline 
range for the fine may well be different next time around. 
  
1990, see United States v. Eisenberg, 734 F. Supp. 1137, 1167 
(D.N.J. 1990), and denied it again on April 12, 1990, on a motion 
for reconsideration,  see United States v. Eisenberg, 734 F. 
Supp. 1168 (D.N.J. 1990).  We then denied Bertoli's petition for 
a writ of mandamus on May 18, 1990, seeking Judge Lechner's 
disqualification. 
 On July 26, 1990, Bertoli joined in a recusal motion 
made by his co-defendant Cannistraro.  Judge Lechner denied the 
motion on August 16, 1990, and we dismissed Bertoli's subsequent 
appeal.  On July 26, 1991, Judge Lechner denied another motion 
for recusal filed on March 12, 1991.  See United States v. 
Eisenberg, 773 F. Supp. 662, 733 (D.N.J. 1991).  Bertoli's 
December 17, 1992 recusal motion was denied on January 12, 1993.  
On April 23, 1993 we declined to grant Bertoli's petition for a 
writ of mandamus.  Bertoli's petition for a writ of certiorari to 
the United States Supreme Court was denied on October 4, 1993, 
see Bertoli v. United States District Court for the District of 
New Jersey, ____ U.S. ____, 114 S.Ct. 77 (1993).  Finally, 
Bertoli moved to recuse Judge Lechner from the sentencing but 
Judge Lechner denied that motion on March 28, 1993. 
 Our authority to reassign a case on remand stems from 
two sources.  The first stems from the federal recusal statute, 
28 U.S.C. § 455.  Second, our statutory authorization pursuant to 
28 U.S.C. § 2106, to "require such further proceedings to be had 
as may be just under the circumstances" gives us the "ability to 
assign a case to a different judge on remand."  Liteky v. United 
States, ____ U.S. ____, 114 S.Ct. 1147, 1156-57 (1994). 
  
 Bertoli conflates the two provisions in a single 
argument -- that Judge Lechner's apparent repeated hostility to 
him renders the judge unable to preside over a fair trial, and at 
any rate creates a belief of bias and partiality in the mind of 
the objective observer.  We will address the bases for recusal 
separately. 
 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) a federal judge must 
"disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality 
might reasonably be questioned."  See Liteky, ____ U.S. at ____, 
114 S.Ct. at 1150.  Section 455(b)(1) requires disqualification 
where the judge "has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a 
party."  The Supreme Court recently held that subsection (b)'s 
"extrajudicial source" doctrine also applies to subsection (a).  
Liteky, ____ U.S. at ____, 114 S.Ct. at 1157.  Under that 
doctrine, bias, in order to form the basis for recusal, must stem 
from a source outside of the official proceedings.  Because the 
focus is on the source of the judge's views and actions, 
"judicial rulings alone almost never constitute a valid basis for 
a bias or partiality motion" because they almost never arise from 
an extrajudicial source.  Id. at     , 114 S.Ct. at 1157 (citing 
United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 583, 86 S.Ct. 
1698, 1710 (1966)).  Similarly, and for the same reason, 
"judicial remarks during the course of a trial that are critical 
or disapproving of, or even hostile to, counsel, the parties, or 
their cases, ordinarily do not support a bias or partiality 
challenge."  Id. at     , 114 S.Ct. at 1157. 
  
 Despite finding an extra-judicial source requirement 
under section 455(a), the Liteky Court held that opinions formed 
during a judicial proceeding may in certain instances give rise 
to a duty to recuse.  The court reasoned that if during "a 
lengthy trial . . . the presiding judge for the first time learns 
of an obscure religious sect, and acquires a passionate hatred 
for all its adherents," the fact that the beliefs arose through a 
judicial proceeding is of no consequence.  Id. at     , 114 S.Ct. 
at 1154.  The duty to recuse would arise.  This is because the 
words "extrajudicial bias" really are intended to convey the 
notion of a "wrongful or inappropriate" bias, regardless of 
whether the improper bias arises from evidence adduced at trial 
or from some extraneous source.  "A favorable or unfavorable 
predisposition can . . . deserve to be characterized as 'bias' or 
'prejudice' because, even though it springs from the facts 
adduced or the events occurring at trial, it is so extreme as to 
display clear inability to render fair judgment."  Id. at     , 
114 S.Ct. at 1155.  In order for such bias to create a duty to 
recuse, however, the court's actions must "reveal such a high 
degree of favoritism or antagonism as to make fair judgment 
impossible."  Id. at     , 114 S.Ct. at 1157.  Of course, section 
455(a), by providing for recusal when a judge's impartiality may 
"reasonably be questioned" still mandates an objective rather 
than a subjective inquiry.  See id. at     , 114 S.Ct. at 1156 
n.2 ("The judge does not have to be subjectively biased or 
prejudiced, so long as he appears to be so.") (emphasis in 
original); Alexander v. Primerica Holdings, Inc., 10 F.3d 155, 
  
162 (3d Cir. 1993) ("[T]he public's confidence in the judiciary, 
which may be irreparably harmed if a case is allowed to proceed 
before a judge who appears to be tainted", requires that "justice 
must satisfy the appearance of justice.") (quoting In re Asbestos 
Litig., 977 F.2d 764, 776 (3d Cir. 1992)). 
 Bertoli makes no allegation that Judge Lechner derived 
his bias from an extrajudicial source.  Rather, all the incidents 
he cites in his brief involve rulings and statements made by the 
judge during the proceedings.  Thus, these incidents will not 
support recusal unless, looked at objectively, "they display a 
deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair 
judgment impossible." 
 We previously have commented on the antagonisms between 
Judge Lechner and Bertoli and his various attorneys.  When 
deciding a prior interlocutory appeal on May 7, 1993, we said: 
 Perhaps understandably, the record in this case hints 
at some animus between the court and Bertoli and 
Bertoli's counsel.  Bertoli has sought recusal on 
several occasions.  He has called into question the 
district judge's ability to adjudicate fairly his 
pretrial motions.  Some of the exchanges at the 
hearings the district court has already held indicate 
that this case has been contentious. 
 
United States v. Bertoli, 994 F.2d 1002, 1025 (3d Cir.), cert. 
denied,     U.S.   , 114 S.Ct. 77 (1993).  We cautioned counsel 
and the court to "strive to avoid even the hint of rancor."  Id. 
at 1027.  It is unfortunate that the rancor nevertheless 
continued. 
 But yet we do not believe the record indicates the type 
of bias that would warrant Judge Lechner's recusal from this 
  
case.  The essence of Bertoli's argument is that Judge Lechner 
took every occasion to express dissatisfaction with him and his 
counsel, and increased Bertoli's sentence at every opportunity.  
A number of Bertoli's objections involve the judge's legal 
rulings and factual findings.28  As noted above, such decisions 
rarely form the basis for recusal, especially since such 
decisions properly can be reviewed upon appeal.  It is true that 
Judge Lechner sentenced Bertoli severely.  But Bertoli was 
accused and convicted of serious crimes.  The judge's "knowledge 
and the opinion it produced were properly and necessarily 
acquired in the course of the proceedings, and are indeed 
sometimes . . . necessary to completion of the judge's task."  
Liteky,     U.S. at    , 114 S.Ct. at 1155.  We do not believe 
that a reasonable person, looking at the rulings objectively, 
would conclude that the court was partial.  Other objections 
involve the judge's disposition towards Bertoli.29  However, the 
                     
28
.  For instance, Bertoli points out that: 
 
 -- The judge believed Juror Six over Juror Thirteen; 
 
 -- After the verdict, the judge remanded Bertoli rather 
than keeping him free on bail; 
 
 -- The judge's credibility and legal determinations at 
sentencing generally resulted in increases in the offense level; 
 
 -- The judge adopted the government's arguments about 
how to group the offenses for sentencing purposes. 
 
29
.  For instance: 
 




judge's comments, while perhaps reflecting impatience and 
frustration, appear to have been directed solely at the manner in 
which Bertoli tried his case.  In fact, "[i]f the judge did not 
form judgments of the actors in those court-house dramas called 
trials, he could never render decisions."  Id. at    , 114 S.Ct. 
at 1155 (quoting In re J.P. Linahan, Inc., 138 F.2d 650, 654 (2d 
Cir. 1943)); see also Liteky,     U.S. at    , 114 S.Ct. at 1157 
("A judge's ordinary efforts at courtroom administration -- even 
a stern and short-tempered judge's ordinary efforts at courtroom 
administration -- remain immune."). 
 Thus, this case is distinguishable from other occasions 
where we have required recusal.  In Primerica Holdings, Inc., the 
record reflected that the district judge accused the petitioners 
(..continued) 
 -- In denying Bertoli's motion for a mistrial, the 
judge described the motion as "ridiculous, absurd and baseless."  
He further said 
 
  You have been conducting yourself throughout this 
trial trying to create error, trying to create a 
record.  This is another example of it.  This is 
an absurd motion, it's just another in the line of 
your baseless motions.  That's denied.  Now please 
sit down.  Mr. Bertoli, your smirks, your 
laughing, your rolling your eyes, your sneering 
can't be tolerated any more.  If you do it again 
in front of the jury, I'll have to comment in 
front of the jury.  You're out of bounds and 
unprofessional.  You're not conducting yourself 
the way you should.  You're not acting like an 
attorney.  Your cross-examination was anything but 
an attorney's cross-examination.  Now, please stop 
it and please sit down and remain there.  App. at 
670-71. 
 
 -- The judge told Bertoli that "[f]rom day one in this 
case either you or your attorneys have been taunting me." 
  
themselves of acting in bad faith, and by responding in detail to 
a petition for a writ of mandamus, had taken a personal interest 
in the case.  In Haines v. Liggett Group Inc., 975 F.2d 81, 98 
(3d Cir. 1992), statements in a pre-trial opinion by the judge 
appeared to pre-judge important and disputed issues in the case; 
see also In re Asbestos Litig., 977 F.2d at 778-85 (judge's 
attendance at conference at plaintiff's expense constituted 
appearance of partiality). 
 We are all the more wary of reassigning this case, 
because the record reflects that Bertoli engaged in a concerted 
campaign to have Judge Lechner removed from the case.  On 
November 2, 1987, Bertoli wrote a letter to Judge Lechner 
criticizing the judge's handling of Cannistraro's sentencing in 
an earlier case.  He threatened that "[i]f you do not resign from 
the bench within thirty days, I will refer this matter to the 
Judiciary committee and bar association for action."  App. at 
346.  The next day, Bertoli wrote to then-Justice Thurgood 
Marshall of the United States Supreme Court purporting to make a 
"formal complaint and request to reprimand and take such other 
action including impeachment. . . ."  App. at 346-47 (quoting 
letter).  Then, Bertoli boasted to others that he was trying to 
antagonize the judge.  See app. at 354-55.  Moreover, these 
actions occurred at a time when "it appear[ed] Bertoli was aware 
that he was a subject of a grand jury investigation which also 
concerned Eisenberg."  Eisenberg, 734 F. Supp. at 1145.  We 
always should be "keenly aware of the impact [decisions mandating 
recusal] might have on the conduct of all disputed matters and 
  
cases that district court judges try."  Primerica Holdings, Inc., 
10 F.3d at 166.  This principle is especially important in this 
case, lest we encourage tactics designed to force recusal. 
 Nor will we exercise our supervisory powers to reassign 
the case upon remand.  Although in Liteky, the Supreme Court 
declined to address whether the "extrajudicial source" doctrine 
applies to a Court of Appeals' supervisory powers to reassign a 
case upon remand, we previously have reviewed such requests under 
an "appearance of impartiality" standard.  Primerica Holdings, 
Inc., 10 F.3d at 167; Blasband v. Rales, 979 F.2d 324, 328 (3d 
Cir. 1992); Haines, 975 F.2d at 98.  We need not address the 
extent to which the standards set forth in Liteky apply to this 
supervisory power, because we simply do not believe the district 
court has exhibited an appearance of partiality. 
 
 III.  CONCLUSION 
 For all the reasons detailed above, we will affirm the 
judgment of conviction on March 30, 1994.  However, we will 
vacate the sentence and will remand to the district court for 
resentencing in accordance with this opinion. 
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ROTH, Circuit Judge, concurring: 
 
 
  I join the opinion in Parts I, II.A.1, and 2, 
II.B, and III.  I concur with the result that the majority 
reaches in Part II.A.3.  I write separately, however, to express 
my concern on the issue of providing written transcripts to the 
jury.  I recognize that other circuits have afforded trial courts 
great discretion in determining whether or not to allow copies of 
written transcripts to go to the jury.  In view of this 
precedent, I agree that the trial court in this case did not 
abuse its discretion.   
  I approve the cautionary language that the 
majority suggests to prevent the jury from focusing improperly on 
one portion of the testimony contained in a transcript.  However, 
I would prefer to go further.  I would exercise our court's 
inherent supervisory power to bar trial courts from permitting 
the jury to obtain copies of written transcripts of trial 
testimony unless the district judge ensured that:  (1) no party 
was likely to be unduly prejudiced, and (2) the transcript or 
particular portion thereof was not likely to be improperly used 
by the jury.30  In this regard, the trial court should afford 
                     
30
.    Although it is not to be invoked lightly, we have 
exercised our supervisory power to resolve various procedural and 
  
counsel for each party the opportunity to express counsel's 
opinion as to the likelihood of prejudice and improper use.   
  The Uniform Rules of Criminal Procedure (1987) 
provide support for the limitation that I would propose to place 
on a trial court's discretion to send written transcripts to the 
jury.  In particular, Rule 533 provides that:   
  "If the jury, after retiring for 
deliberations, requests a review of any 
evidence, the court, after notice to the 
parties, shall recall the jury to the 
courtroom.  If the jury's request is 
reasonable, the court shall have any 
requested portion of the testimony read or 
played back to the jury and permit the jury 
to reexamine any requested exhibit received 
in evidence.  The court need not submit 
evidence to the jury for review beyond that 
specifically requested by the jury, but the 
court also may have the jury review other 
evidence relating to the same factual issue 
in order to avoid undue emphasis on the 
evidence requested.  If it is likely that the 
jury cannot otherwise adequately consider any 
evidence reviewed, the court may permit the 
jury to take the evidence, including any part 
of a deposition or of a prepared transcript 
or recording of the testimony, to the jury 
room if it appears: 
(..continued) 
substantive matters and to provide guidance to the district 
courts.  See, e.g., Pansy v. Borough of Stroudsburg, 23 F.3d 772, 
786 and n.16 (3d Cir. 1994) (invoking inherent supervisory power 
to require a showing of good cause whenever order of 
confidentiality is granted); Sowell v. Butcher & Singer, Inc., 
926 F.2d 289, 295 (3d Cir. 1991) (invoked supervisory power to 
require district courts, when granting motion for directed 
verdict, to set forth explanation sufficient to permit this Court 
to understand legal premise upon which decision was based); see 
also Murray M. Schwartz, The Exercise of Supervisory Power By the 




  (1) no party will be unduly prejudiced; 
and 
 
  (2) the evidence is not likely to be 
improperly used by the jury. 
 
(emphasis added).31   
  I believe that the exercise of our supervisory 
power in this manner would best protect the parties from the the 
problems which are inherent in permitting trial transcripts to go 
to the jury room.  At the same time we would afford a district 
court the discretion to provide the jury with transcripts when 
                     
31
.  It is worthy of note, however, that the American Bar 
Association's related Standard 15-4.2 of its Standards for 
Criminal Justice (1991) does not make any reference to the 
practice of permitting transcripts of testimony to go into the 
jury room:  
 Jury request to review evidence. 
  (a)  If the jury, after retiring for 
deliberation, requests a review of certain 
testimony or other evidence, they shall be 
conducted to the courtroom.  Whenever the 
jury's request is reasonable, the court, 
after notice to the prosecutor and counsel 
for the defense, shall have the requested 
parts of the testimony read to the jury and 
shall permit the jury to reexamine the 
requested materials admitted into evidence. 
  (b)  The court need not submit evidence 
to the jury for review beyond that 
specifically requested by the jury, but in 
its discretion the court may also have the 
jury review other evidence relating to the 
same factual issue so as not to give undue 
prominence to the evidence requested. 
(emphasis added).  I read the failure of this standard to discuss 
the practice of sending transcripts to the jury as a reluctance 
on the part of the ABA to encourage courts to engage in such a 
practice on a regular basis.    
  
the court determines that such a practice is necessary and not 
likely to be prejudicial to the parties.  Although such a rule 
might indeed constitute an "intrusion into the district court's 
discretion to adapt procedures to the situation in the case 
before it," see Majority Opinion at 35, because of the magnitude 
of my concerns, I consider such an intrusion to be warranted.   
